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Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan's Gulf exposure is capital, not oil: Gulf direct investment stood at $3.3bn at end-2024 (1.07% of GDP), $2.7bn from the UAE. Its own crude, 75.7 Mt exported in 2025, ships outside the Strait. Approved reading

This page answers: Which questions do our briefs address about Kazakhstan?

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  • Region Russia and Eurasia · Central Asia
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Your exposure

Kazakhstan in our readings

Kazakhstan is in 1 of our country readings.

  • Gulf war / Hormuz Low

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Country card

Energy and value chains

EXHIBIT T-1 · KAZAKHSTAN
Kazakhstan produced more energy than it used in 2024.
Each figure in its own unit; each figure's year is shown.
Net import dependence, all energy
net exporter2024 · our calculation, EIA data
Largest energy source
Coal, 50.3%2024 · share of primary energy use · our calculation, EIA data
Electricity mix
Coal, 54.3%2025 · share of electricity generated · EmberRenewables 14.9% The latest year is partly estimated by Ember.
Coal supplier concentration (HHI, 0–1)
0.002024 · index 0–1, EC line 0.40 · our calculation, EIA, Eurostat dataEC band: diversified Built from partner data (mirror): suppliers that publish nothing are missing, so the index is a lower bound.

Value-chain positions: not on file.

SourceUS Energy Information Administration, EIA International Energy Data, energy balance by fuel (bulk INTL), all countries (Public domain (US federal work); credit EIA); Ember, Electricity data (yearly and monthly) (All of Ember's electricity data is fully open, CC BY 4.0.); US Energy Information Administration, EIA US imports and exports by partner country, petroleum products, natural gas and coal (bulk PET, NG, COAL) (Public domain (US federal work); credit EIA); Eurostat, Energy imports and exports by partner country (nrg_ti_* and nrg_te_*), all Eurostat energy reporters (CC BY 4.0; commercial reuse allowed with source credit.). Shares and the index: our calculation from these figures.How to read this plateEach figure carries its own year and unit; they sit side by side and are never added into one score. Supplier concentration: 0 = many small suppliers, 1 = one supplier; the European Commission draws a line at 0.40.
Exhibit T-1 · Kazakhstan · strature.net

The supply balance, good by good, is under Goods and chokepoints.

Outlook to October 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Not yet set
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Not yet set
  • Supply chains and chokepoints Not yet set
  • Energy and resources Elevated
  • Technology and cyber Not yet set
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Not yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare Kazakhstan on the outlook map

Dates for Kazakhstan on the risk calendar

The other side: 3 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach Kazakhstan

  • Gulf war / Hormuz Low

    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Strait of Hormuz

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much Kazakhstan makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • Quarterly National Bank direct investment by country: whether UAE and Qatar inflows hold. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Q3 2029 Commercial operation of the Masdar-led wind farm in the Zhambyl region. Gulf war / Hormuz

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of the risks above reach our own suppliers, customers or assets in Kazakhstan?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Kazakhstan, and which outcome would change them?
  • Which dated items under What to watch fall inside our next planning cycle?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Full analyst view

Open Kazakhstan on the map of brief questions

Country analysis

Questions our briefs address

The questions our published briefs address that touch Kazakhstan.

Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan's Gulf exposure is capital, not oil: Gulf direct investment stood at $3.3bn at end-2024 (1.07% of GDP), $2.7bn from the UAE. Its own crude, 75.7 Mt exported in 2025, ships outside the Strait.est.

Theme band Low

US$3.28bn

Gulf direct investment position, US$bn, end-2024 (IMF)

1.07%

Gulf direct investment position, % of GDP

US$2.71bn

UAE direct investment position, US$bn, end-2024 (IMF)

75.7est.

Crude oil exports, Mt, 2025

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Gulf money is concentrated in two states. The UAE sent $1.398bn and Qatar $1.2bn of direct investment in Jan-Sep 2025. A Gulf fiscal squeeze from lost exports could slow new commitments. Estimate from press or commentary
  • The Masdar-led $1.4bn wind and storage project broke ground on 29 Jun 2026, with operation planned for Q3 2029 (reported). No financial close was found in the press and company sources searched in Oct 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Exports to Iran nearly doubled to $239.3m in 2025, mostly grain. A war in Iran puts that market and its payments at risk. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Fuel imports are rising. Diesel imports reached 330.5 kt in Jan-Nov 2025, four times a year earlier, and about 42% of jet fuel comes from Russia (estimate). A Gulf product squeeze raises the cost of replacements. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Volumes face a nearer threat than the Gulf: CPC volumes net to KMG fell 7.4% in H1 2026, after disruption at the terminal and intake limits.

Opportunities

  • Europe took 86% of crude and condensate exports in 2025, Italy 38%. Buyers replacing Gulf barrels can turn to Caspian crude that loads outside the Strait. Estimate from press or commentary
  • KMG sold 66.7% of its oil and condensate supply to export markets in 2025, so higher prices reach the national oil company.
  • Polypropylene export sales rose to 161.4 kt in 2025 from 112.1 kt, while Gulf petrochemical shipments depend on the Strait.

Uncertainties

  • Inflow figures differ by source and period: $1.398bn from the UAE in Jan-Sep 2025 (National Bank, via the press) and $1.64bn for the year (foreign minister). Part of the money routed through Dubai may not be Gulf-origin (commentary). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Press puts cumulative UAE inflows at over $7.3bn, but the official position at end-2024 was $2.7bn, which suggests inflows are partly repaid or routed onward. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Whether higher oil prices outweigh lost volume. CPC, the main export route, ends at a Black Sea terminal exposed to strikes.

What to watch

  • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves. A renewed strike could test Gulf export revenue and Gulf investment budgets.
  • QuarterlyNational Bank direct investment by country: whether UAE and Qatar inflows hold.
  • MonthlyCPC loadings and KMG trading updates.
  • Q3 2029Commercial operation of the Masdar-led wind farm in the Zhambyl region.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Gulf capitalCapital and finance1.07% of GDP end-2024 position / 2025 GDPHormuz Gulf inward direct investment position as a share of GDPLowHigh ≥10% of GDP or ≥25% of FX reserves · Medium 2–10% of GDP · Low <2% of GDP but ≥US$1bn

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

UAE share of gross direct investment inflow, 2025 (%)
UAE share of gross direct investment inflow: 8% (2025) (our calculation)UAE*8

Gulf

Drawn to scale from zero. * Our calculation from the cited figures.

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Hormuz Gulf inward direct investment position as a share of GDP: 1.07% of GDP (= Hormuz Gulf inward DI position end-2024 / nominal GDP 2025 × 100)
  • UAE share of gross direct investment inflow: 8% (= UAE direct investment 2025 / gross FDI inflow 2025 × 100)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 28 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

ISO 3166-1 name: Kazakhstan (KAZ). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

Sources and licences

No figure on this page yet.

Cite this page Strature, “Kazakhstan”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/kaz/, 31 Oct 2026.

  • We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
  • General research, not advice.
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