KQ-07: Which of six registered scenarios describes Iran on 18 July 2028, and does any single one become likely?

Our standing estimate

Six registered outcomes; they do not cover every outcome. Our estimate, scored when it resolves.

Guard-Managed Attrition

13.74% · very unlikely · moderate confidence

The Revolutionary Guard and security apparatus control the state, strikes and counter-strikes go on with no durable settlement and no regime collapse, and no verified nuclear deal is in force.

F-0020 · Open
Contested Drift / Paralysis

11.7% · very unlikely · moderate confidence

No one holds uncontested control at the top, the stance abroad is indecisive, and the nuclear file sits without inspectors.

F-0008 · Open
Nuclear Dash under Pressure

11.5% · very unlikely · low-moderate confidence

Iran takes a publicly assessed, decisive step toward a nuclear weapon, such as weapons-grade enrichment, a device or a test.

F-0009 · Open
Frozen Siege

9.2% · very unlikely · moderate confidence

An armed no-war-no-peace: fighting has largely stopped for more than 6 months, without a settlement and with sanctions intact.

F-0010 · Open
Regime-Targeting War & Rupture

6.5% · very unlikely · low-moderate confidence

A campaign aimed at the regime coincides with its fragmentation, loss of territory, or the collapse of the Islamic Republic's order.

F-0011 · Open
Negotiated Off-ramp

4.16% · almost no chance (remote) · low-moderate confidence

A negotiated settlement is in force that eases sanctions and verifies nuclear limits, signed by a leadership able to deliver it.

F-0021 · Open
Not registered: outside all 6 outcomes

43.2%

These six registered scenarios add up to 56.8%. The brief puts about 43% outside all six; that remainder is not a registered forecast.

The situation when it was sealed (7 Aug 2026). In the 2026 war Iran's clerical apex fell; the source judged the Revolutionary Guard the decisive force, the only intact institution of national reach.

How it moved

Each point is a sealed register row; a line joins a superseded estimate to the one that replaced it. Superseded estimates stay listed and are scored.

The vertical line is 31 Oct 2026. Numbers match the outcomes above.

Every sealed estimate for this question: outcome number, register row, date sealed, estimate, status
No.	Row	Sealed	Estimate	Status
1	F-0007	23 Jul 2026	15.1%	Superseded, still scored
1	F-0020	7 Aug 2026	13.74%	Open
2	F-0008	23 Jul 2026	11.7%	Open
3	F-0009	23 Jul 2026	11.5%	Open
4	F-0010	23 Jul 2026	9.2%	Open
5	F-0011	23 Jul 2026	6.5%	Open
6	F-0012	23 Jul 2026	5.3%	Superseded, still scored
6	F-0021	7 Aug 2026	4.16%	Open

Reassessments

7 Aug 2026
F-0007 at 15.1% was replaced by F-0020 at 13.74%, a new sealed row. Both stay listed and scored.
7 Aug 2026
F-0012 at 5.3% was replaced by F-0021 at 4.16%, a new sealed row. Both stay listed and scored.

Signposts

What the brief says would move the view, quoted from it.

What would prove the Iran call wrong?
The call would be wrong if a single future became likely: above all, a durable settlement signed by an Iranian leadership able to deliver it, with independent nuclear verification restored and six months without cross-border strikes. Read it in the brief

Why it matters, by category

Geopolitics and conflict

The largest Iran exposure most firms carry sits outside Iran: the strait, the oil price, the compliance chain and Gulf assets.
Is any single future for Iran likely?
No. The most likely of six registered futures, a Guard-run holding pattern, stands at 13.74%, our estimate, scored when it resolves; about 43% lies outside all six. Read it in the brief
Do the six registered futures resolve the crisis?
Three futures, Guard-Managed Attrition, Contested Drift and Frozen Siege, are variants of no resolution: the conflict grinds, freezes or muddles on. Read it in the brief
Were any of the registered Iran forecasts corrected?
Both moved down, and the unnamed tail moved up, from about 41% to about 43%: the correction made the outlook less confident, not more. Read it in the brief

Countries it touches

The countries our register links to these forecasts, most often linked first.

How it resolves

The registered words that decide each forecast, quoted unchanged.

F-0020, F-0007
“As of 2028-07-18, ALL of: (a) the IRGC/security apparatus is the de facto controlling authority of the Iranian state (whether or not a nominal Supreme Leader is in place); (b) the Israel/US-Iran confrontation has continued as an intermittent, unresolved strike-and-counterstrike pattern WITHOUT a durable comprehensive settlement AND without a regime collapse/replacement; and (c) no IAEA-verified comprehensive nuclear agreement limiting enrichment is in force. Score YES if all three hold, PARTIAL if two hold, NO otherwise.”
F-0008
“As of 2028-07-18: the apex remains openly contested/unconsolidated (no single actor or council exercises uncontested control) AND external posture is indecisive (neither durable settlement nor full regime-targeting war), with the nuclear file at inspector-less ambiguity. YES if apex-contested AND indecisive-posture both hold; else NO/PARTIAL.”
F-0009
“As of 2028-07-18: Iran has taken an observable, IAEA/IC-assessed decisive step toward a nuclear weapon (e.g. enrichment to weapons-grade, a device, or a test) OR credible public assessment that weaponization is underway. YES if such a step is publicly assessed to have occurred; NO otherwise.”
F-0010
“As of 2028-07-18: an armed no-war-no-peace holds — active kinetic exchanges have largely ceased for a sustained period (>6 months) WITHOUT a comprehensive settlement, with the full sanctions architecture intact. YES if a sustained freeze-without-settlement holds; NO otherwise.”
F-0011
“As of 2028-07-18: a sustained regime-targeting military campaign has coincided with regime fragmentation, loss of central control over significant territory, OR replacement/collapse of the Islamic Republic's governing order. YES if regime rupture/fragmentation is observable; NO otherwise.”
F-0021, F-0012
“As of 2028-07-18: a comprehensive negotiated settlement is in force that materially relieves the sanctions wall AND includes verified nuclear limits, signed by an Iranian leadership able to deliver it domestically. YES if such a settlement is in force; NO otherwise.”

The seals: each statement’s SHA-256 fingerprint

F-0020 sealed 7 Aug 2026SHA-256 c38560dc3c7e23a952632736d3297e40c558666fa1ae64b98e42c4839426d4cc
F-0008 sealed 23 Jul 2026SHA-256 eeaf5fc8c395ce9037e65bc7e858e50b672d857f3cd42263a38b9b3c4be59e1a
F-0009 sealed 23 Jul 2026SHA-256 9329ed72ae0bfebb9f4bca76e322f485860dd0799208f8944071275ee7faff38
F-0010 sealed 23 Jul 2026SHA-256 88d2cc55e6569ab2b5fa24636c6af0be73f933dbf997ada5419315e650a791ca
F-0011 sealed 23 Jul 2026SHA-256 34b89369458673af8b63f92e6d76a407b85509fba4bb9611d74ce2e97a205708
F-0021 sealed 7 Aug 2026SHA-256 b637b0e54b50dc16288c4c00f8a23fa0473522b320ff1fe9f8d33d15f3ff02b1
F-0007 sealed 23 Jul 2026SHA-256 45695c80002179ec64fae89149f504962ae72c56a6325de336ad6f1a652939ee
F-0012 sealed 23 Jul 2026SHA-256 fe91cb70eba1da2efae9c5b798b6a49d074fb54177b722df93324ea007bff0c3

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Each probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Forecasts are general research on public events and policy; they are not investment, legal or tax advice.