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Pakistan

Pakistan is among the most exposed importers, yet no released brief treats it as exposed. Gulf LNG, fuel, remittances and Saudi deposits all matter at once; the GCC supplies 81% of its fuel imports. Approved reading

This page answers: Which questions do our briefs address about Pakistan?

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  • Region Asia-Pacific · South Asia
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Your exposure

Pakistan in our readings

Pakistan is in 1 of our country readings; High in 1.

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Country card

Energy and value chains

EXHIBIT T-1 · PAKISTAN
Pakistan imported 44.5% of the energy it used in 2024.
Each figure in its own unit; each figure's year is shown.
Net import dependence, all energy
44.5%2024 · share of the energy it used · our calculation, EIA data
Largest energy source
Gas, 36.1%2024 · share of primary energy use · our calculation, EIA data
Electricity mix
Hydro, 23.3%2025 · share of electricity generated · EmberRenewables 46.8% The latest year is partly estimated by Ember.
LNG supplier concentration (HHI, 0–1)
0.002023 · index 0–1, EC line 0.40 · our calculation, EIA dataEC band: diversified Built from partner data (mirror): suppliers that publish nothing are missing, so the index is a lower bound.

Value-chain positions: not on file.

SourceUS Energy Information Administration, EIA International Energy Data, energy balance by fuel (bulk INTL), all countries (Public domain (US federal work); credit EIA); Ember, Electricity data (yearly and monthly) (All of Ember's electricity data is fully open, CC BY 4.0.); US Energy Information Administration, EIA International Energy Data (API v2, bulk) (Public domain (US federal work); credit EIA). Shares and the index: our calculation from these figures.How to read this plateEach figure carries its own year and unit; they sit side by side and are never added into one score. Supplier concentration: 0 = many small suppliers, 1 = one supplier; the European Commission draws a line at 0.40.
Exhibit T-1 · Pakistan · strature.net

The supply balance, good by good, is under Goods and chokepoints.

Outlook to October 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Not yet set
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Not yet set
  • Supply chains and chokepoints High
  • Energy and resources Severe
  • Technology and cyber Not yet set
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Not yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare Pakistan on the outlook map

Dates for Pakistan on the risk calendar

Key questions (1)
The other side: 2 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach Pakistan

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High

    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Strait of Hormuz

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

Who runs short first is not shown for Pakistan: no Hormuz shipping volume (tonnes or barrels) for it is on file, and the scenario cases need one.

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much Pakistan makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • 4 Nov 2026 QatarEnergy force majeure to Pakistan due to end (as reported). Gulf war / Hormuz
  • 20 Nov 2026 F-0074 resolves. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Late Nov–Dec 2026 IMF fourth EFF review: next tranche of about US$1.0bn. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Weekly SBP-held reserves: US$21.44bn on 25 Sep 2026. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Monthly State Bank remittances by country; Qatari cargo arrivals. Gulf war / Hormuz

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of the risks above reach our own suppliers, customers or assets in Pakistan?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Pakistan, and which outcome would change them?
  • Which dated items under What to watch fall inside our next planning cycle?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Full analyst view

Open Pakistan on the map of brief questions

Dependency profile

Country card · Pakistan, importer through the straits

Chokepoints. The Energy and Value-chain strips appear here as each is approved for Pakistan.

Chokepoints

LNG via Hormuz
90% of imports (2025)
Urea and nitrogen fertilisers, import dependence
0%
Stock cover (crude oil stocks (Petroleum Secretary to the Senate committee, via IANS))
11 days (19 Mar 2026)

Most of its LNG comes from Qatar and most of its crude from the Gulf; nearly half its remittances come from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and in March 2026 it held about 11 days of crude. 1

Modelled shares by strait (Strature route model)
  • LNG, 2025: Hormuz 90% (the route model covers 90% of its named imports) modelled

Dashed underline = low confidence.

importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›

Where Pakistan’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way

DirectionYear

Sources in this profile

Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Modelled shares come from Strature’s route model, not from a cited figure.

Show the list

    Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.

    No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.

    Country analysis

    Questions our briefs address

    The questions our published briefs address that touch Pakistan.

    Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Pakistan

    Pakistan is among the most exposed importers, yet no released brief treats it as exposed. Gulf LNG, fuel, remittances and Saudi deposits all matter at once; the GCC supplies 81% of its fuel imports.

    Theme band High

    98%

    of LNG imports from Qatar (2025)

    81%

    of fuel imports from the GCC (IMF, Apr 2026)

    5.52%

    of GDP: remittances from the GCC, US$22.52bn (FY2025/26)

    37.3%

    of SBP reserves: Saudi deposits of US$8bn (US$5bn on a three-year tenor, US$3bn rolled over in July)

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • Gas: QatarEnergy force majeure runs to 4 Nov 2026; spot bids at US$26.97/MMBtu were rejected in September, and 3,600 MW of night-peak power was lost in August. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Fuel: a record diesel premium of US$34 a barrel in April, and petrol cover of 18 days in September. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Prices: CPI inflation reached 10.3% in Sep 2026, with transport up 27.4%. Estimate from press or commentary

    Opportunities

    • Remittances stay high: US$3.6bn in Sep 2026, up 12.7% on a year earlier.
    • Food exports to the Gulf: 51.1% of animal-product exports go to the GCC.

    Uncertainties

    • A Saudi deferred-oil facility of US$6.7bn was requested in July; no signature was found by 6 Oct 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
    • The Saudi-backed Gwadar refinery (US$10bn) was first pledged in 2019; no construction start was found in the sources read by Oct 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Pakistan opened 6 overland transit routes to Iran in Apr 2026 (Transit of Goods Order 2026); how much trade uses them, and under what sanctions exposure, is not assessed here. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Exports to the GCC and Iran were 10.05% of goods exports in 2025, above the 10% line only with Oman counted; without Oman the share is 9.38%.

    What to watch

    • 4 Nov 2026QatarEnergy force majeure to Pakistan due to end (as reported).
    • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves.
    • Late Nov–Dec 2026IMF fourth EFF review: next tranche of about US$1.0bn.
    • WeeklySBP-held reserves: US$21.44bn on 25 Sep 2026.
    • MonthlyState Bank remittances by country; Qatari cargo arrivals.

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    LNGDependence98% 2025Share of LNG imports from QatarHighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
    Crude oilDependence80%est. 2025-2026Share of crude imports passing through HormuzHighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
    Refined productsDependence82.1% 2025Share of refined product imports (HS 2710) from Gulf producers, by valueHighHigh ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20%
    SulphurFood and farming63.4% 2025Share of sulphur imports (HS 2503) from Gulf producers (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Iran, Iraq, Bahrain)HighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
    RemittancesRemittances5.52% of GDP FY2025/26GCC remittances as % of GDPHighHigh ≥5% of GDP · Medium 2–5% of GDP · Low <2% of GDP but ≥US$1bn
    Gulf capitalCapital and finance37.3% of SBP reserves 2026-09Gulf (Saudi) deposits at SBP as % of SBP-held reservesHighHigh ≥10% of GDP or ≥25% of FX reserves · Medium 2–10% of GDP · Low <2% of GDP but ≥US$1bn
    Fertiliser (urea)Food and farming5% 2025Share of urea imports from Gulf producers (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq)Below lineHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
    Exports to the GulfTrade10.1% exports 2025Share of goods exports to GCC6+IranMediumHigh ≥25% · Medium 10–25% · Low 5–10%

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Remittances by source, FY2025/26 (US$ bn)
    Remittances from Saudi Arabia: US$9.78bn (FY2025/26)Saudi Arabia9.8Remittances from the UAE: US$8.81bn (FY2025/26)UAE8.8Remittances from other GCC states (Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain): US$3.93bn (FY2025/26)Other GCC states3.9Workers' remittances, total: US$41.6bn (FY2025/26)Total41.6Remittances from the six GCC states: US$22.5bn (FY2025/26) (our calculation)Six GCC states*22.5

    GulfTotals

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Remittances: cushion with a catch (Business Recorder Research, citing SBP). * Our calculation from the cited figures.

    Briefs and questions

    Sources cited

    Estimates from press or commentary

    Our calculations

    • GCC remittances as % of GDP: 5.52% of GDP (= 22.52 / 407.786)
    • Gulf (Saudi) deposits at SBP as % of SBP-held reserves: 37.3% of SBP reserves (= (5 + 3) / 21.439)
    • Share of goods exports to GCC6+Iran: 10.1% exports (= (3.092 + 0.00002) / 30.756 = 10.05%)
    • Scenario: combined one-quarter FX hit (LNG premium + oil price + 10% fall in GCC remittances) as % of SBP reserves: 9.1% of SBP reserves (= (0.67 + 0.71 + 2.25 / 4) / 21.439 = 1.94 / 21.439)
    • Scenario: extra FX cost of replacing Qatari LNG with spot cargoes for 3 months (Nov 2026-Jan 2027) after a renewed strike: US$0.67bn (= cargoes × 3.076m MMBtu × (spot - 12.24); central 6 a month × 3 × (24.43 - 12.24); low 12 × (21.88 - 12.24); high 21 × (26.97 - 12.24))
    • Scenario: extra oil import bill for one quarter if a renewed strike adds US$10-20/bbl: US$0.71bn per quarter (= 1.9 × 1.5 / 4 (low 1.8 × 1 / 4; high 2.0 × 2 / 4))
    • Scenario: annual reserve hit from a 10% fall in GCC remittances: US$2.25bn per year (= 0.10 × 22.52)
    • Remittances from the six GCC states: US$22.5bn (= 9.78 + 8.81 + 3.93)

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 26 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

    Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Pakistan: what passes the strait

    Most of its LNG comes from Qatar and most of its crude from the Gulf; nearly half its remittances come from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and in March 2026 it held about 11 days of crude.

    Its DAP-making capacity is about 0.65 Mt a year.

    Route shares are modelled estimates; each figure carries its source. General research, not advice.

    Open on the Hormuz page The briefing

    ISO 3166-1 name: Pakistan (PAK). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

    Sources and licences

    No figure on this page yet.

    Cite this page Strature, “Pakistan”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/pak/, 31 Oct 2026.

    • We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
    • General research, not advice.
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