Sign in Get in touch
World risk · Geopolitics and conflict · Taiwan Strait & China

China squeezes Taiwan's sea lanes: quarantine or blockade

The test Between 25 Oct 2026 and 25 Oct 2027, Chinese state forces (coast guard, maritime safety agencies or the PLA) impose inspections, a quarantine or a closure on commercial traffic to or from at least one Taiwan port (boarding or turning back ships, or a declared rule ships must obey to reach the port), or go further to a blockade or an attack; live-fire zones in a time-limited exercise that leave port traffic free do not count. In substance this matches Strature's registered outcome F-0202, plus the worse outcome F-0203; those two run to 30 Jun 2027, this risk to 25 Oct 2027.

Not under way · Confidence: medium · Reviewed 25 Oct 2026 · Scores from 1 to 10

This page answers: What could happen, how it is scored, and who is exposed?

Using this page
  1. Read the two scores: Likelihood and Impact are kept apart.
  2. Check what is happening, each fact with its source.
  3. Use the calendar for the dates to watch.

Follow this riskSign in to follow; one weekly email if you ask for it.

Likelihood
4Elevated steady this month
Impact
6Elevated steady this month
Breadth8
Depth4
Duration5
Hard to substitute8
Canada pointNot added0

Impact is the average of the four parts, rounded, plus one point when Canada is directly hit on two or more channels, up to 10.

Two separate scales from 1 to 10. Strature never multiplies or merges them.

What changed

Dated, newest first

  1. Impact 7 to 6.

Why it matters

China has rehearsed cutting Taiwan's ports twice since April 2025 and in June 2026 radioed merchant ships east of Taiwan, but it has not stopped a Taiwan-bound ship, has held no named drill in 2026 and is in a trade truce with Washington that China's commerce ministry says is extended to 10 Jan 2027. A quarantine is not the base case for the next 12 months, but the drivers are in place; if it comes it hits chips, LNG and the sea lanes of a fifth of world sea trade at once.

Why Likelihood 4 Pushes: Blockade drills in 2025 [8][11]; Radio checks of ships, Jun 2026 [12]; Nov-Dec drill season [4]; Pentagon report: PLA aims to be able to fight and win a war over Taiwan by end-2027 [26]. Brakes: No Taiwan-bound ship boarded [12]; No named drill in 2026 [4]; Truce extended to 10 Jan 2027 [45].

Why Impact 6 Scored for the threshold case, a one-port quarantine of a week or two: many countries in two regions buy Taiwan's chips; about US$15bn of trade delayed (estimate); effects last months; partial bypass by other ports, air and routes east of Taiwan. Canada hit directly on one channel only.

The other facts on file (33)
  • The PLA's Eastern Theater Command ran joint drills around Taiwan with land, sea, air and rocket forces on 1-2 Apr; its spokesperson said they tested "area regulation and control, joint blockade and control, and precision strikes on key targets", with training in interception and detention, and that its ground forces practised "precision strikes on simulated targets of key ports and energy facilities". [8]
  • Taiwan's defence ministry counted 76 aircraft and 19 navy and government ships in the 24 hours to the morning of 2 Apr [40], and 59 aircraft, 23 warships and 8 official ships in the 24 hours to 6 am on 3 Apr. [41]
  • The drill covered "a notably larger zone around Taiwan than previous iterations", an analyst told Al Jazeera, and state television said it would focus on sealing off the ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung. [11]
  • Taiwan's defence ministry counted 207 aircraft and 49 ships over the two days; rockets were fired in two waves, the second landing off Tainan inside Taiwan's 24-nautical-mile zone. [9]
  • Taiwan reported 14 Chinese coast guard ships on 29 Dec, and its transport ministry estimated that more than 100,000 international air passengers were affected on 30 Dec. [11]
  • The drill came after the US approved a US$11.1bn arms package for Taiwan in December 2025, Al Jazeera reported. [11]
  • The EU said the drill "endangers international peace and stability". [10]
  • (Strature's brief C-005 dates its end to 31 Dec 2025. ) [1]
  • Over 2,000 Chinese fishing vessels formed a line in the East China Sea on 25 Dec 2025, and over 1,400 again on 8-13 Jan 2026, each line at least 466 km long. [13]
  • No Chinese warplanes were seen near Taiwan from 27 Feb to 13 Mar 2026 except on 7 Mar; patrols resumed on 14 Mar. [13]
  • Trump made a state visit to Beijing in May 2026 and held talks with Xi on the morning of 14 May. [14]
  • That day China's foreign ministry said that, as Xi had noted, the Taiwan question is "the most important issue" in China-US relations, and restated its opposition to US arms sales. [14]
  • In a Fox News interview on 15 May, Trump said: "I'm not looking to have somebody go independent". [35]
  • China's coast guard announced patrols east of Taiwan on 1 Jun, and China's Ministry of Transport announced a "special maritime traffic law enforcement operation" there on 6 Jun [12]; the patrols ran on 6-10 Jun. [13]
  • Six coast guard and maritime patrol ships came as close as 32 nautical miles to Taiwan's east coast; they radioed commercial and fishing ships and demanded port and voyage details. [12]
  • No boarding was reported and no force was used. [12]
  • China called the operation a response to a 28 May meeting of Japan's and the Philippines' leaders; its coast guard also entered Taiwan's restricted waters at Dongsha (Pratas) on 5 Jun. [12]
  • China held at least one large encircling drill each year from 2023 to 2025 and none so far in 2026, Taiwan's defence ministry said on 15 Oct; it is watching the November-December drill season. [4]
  • China closed five sea areas for live fire on 12-17 Oct, the nearest 159 nautical miles from Taiwan [2], and a fleet led by the carrier Liaoning began drills in the western Pacific on 14 Oct. [4]
  • Five China Coast Guard ships followed eight Japan Coast Guard ships that sailed north along the median line to shelter from Typhoon Champi, to an area southwest of Penghu outside Taiwan's 24-nautical-mile zone; Taiwan's coast guard called on China not to "exploit the typhoon" to suggest the strait is its jurisdiction. [43]
  • In the 24 hours to 6 am on 25 Oct 2026 Taiwan's defence ministry saw no Chinese military aircraft, but 5 navy ships and 8 "official" (government) ships [5]; the day before, no aircraft, 1 navy ship and 5 official ships. [6]
  • On 14 Oct it counted 9 aircraft, all crossing the median line, 6 navy ships and 6 official ships. [7]
  • All 24 KMT legislators facing recall on 26 Jul 2025 kept their seats, and 7 more survived on 23 Aug, so the KMT and TPP still control the legislature. [17] [18]
  • President Lai Ching-te's government proposed a NT$1.25tn special defence budget in November 2025; on 8 May 2026 the legislature passed a smaller one, NT$780bn (US$24.8bn) to 2033, by 59 votes to 0 with 48 abstentions: NT$300bn for the US arms approved on 17 Dec 2025 and NT$480bn for a later US package, with domestic and co-development items cut. [21]
  • On 19 May 2026 a motion to impeach him failed: 56 legislators voted for it and 50 against, short of the 76 votes needed. [34]
  • KMT chair Cheng Li-wun met Xi in Beijing on 10 Apr 2026. [15]
  • Local elections are on 28 Nov 2026 [19], for 11,051 posts and about 19.65m voters. [20]
  • In January 2026 the US cut its tariff on Taiwan's goods from 20% to 15%, and Taiwan's chip and tech firms pledged at least US$250bn of US investment. [33]
  • Xi made a state visit to Washington on 23-25 Sep 2026; the two leaders endorsed "the extension of the Kuala Lumpur outcomes" without a published date [16], and China's commerce ministry states that the Kuala Lumpur joint arrangement is extended to 10 Jan 2027. [45]
  • The Pentagon's China report of 23 Dec 2025 says the PLA aims to be able to fight and win a war over Taiwan by the end of 2027, and that in 2024 it practised blocking access to key ports. [26]
  • TSMC plans six logic fabs, two packaging plants and an R&D centre in Arizona, US$265bn in all; the first fab (N4) has made chips in volume since Q4 2024, the second (N3) targets H2 2027, the third (N2 and A16) the end of the decade. [23]
  • It also runs fabs in Kumamoto (Japan), Nanjing and Shanghai (China) and Camas (US). [24]
  • In Q3 2026, 2nm and 3nm chips, made in volume only in Taiwan, earned 41% of TSMC's wafer revenue, up from 33% in Q2; 7nm and below earned 79%. [22] [30]

Where it sits

Taiwan Strait11. China squeezes Taiwan's sea lanes: quarantine or blockade: Elevated impact · possible1 · Elevated impact · possibleTaiwan StraitShanghaiHong KongTokyoCHINAJAPANSOUTH KOREANORTH KOREAVIETNAMEAST CHINA SEASOUTH CHINA SEAPHILIPPINE SEA0500 kmat 30°NMap data: Natural Earth (public domain).
Taiwan Strait11. China squeezes Taiwan's sea lanes: quarantine or blockade: Elevated impact · possibleTaiwan StraitShanghaiCHINASOUTH KOREAEAST CHINA SEA0300 kmat 30°NMap data: Natural Earth (public domain).

How it spreads

If

Between 25 Oct 2026 and 25 Oct 2027, Chinese state forces (coast guard, maritime safety agencies or the PLA) impose inspections, a quarantine or a closure on commercial traffic to or from at least one Taiwan port (boarding or turning back ships, or a declared rule ships must obey to reach the port), or go further to a blockade or an attack; live-fire zones in a time-limited exercise that leave port traffic free do not count. In substance this matches Strature's registered outcome F-0202, plus the worse outcome F-0203; those two run to 30 Jun 2027, this risk to 25 Oct 2027.

Not under way

Channels 6 on the card

  1. CanadaCanada's direct chip exposure is low on Strature's scale (its share of chip imports from Taiwan rests on UN Comtrade data and is held until a second, open source backs it) [30].
    More

    Strature's view: the larger hit would come through US and Japanese industry, electronics prices, Pacific shipping times, and Canada's trade politics with both the US and China.

  2. Chips and the electronics chainTaiwan's ICT products and electronic parts were 74% of its US$640.7bn of goods exports in 2025 [29].
    More

    Japan, South Korea, the US and Canada all buy a large share of their chips from Taiwan; the country shares rest on UN Comtrade data and are held until a second, open source backs them [30]. A quarantine that slows Kaohsiung or Keelung delays these within days; chips mostly fly, but wafers, equipment, gases and chemicals come by sea.

  3. Energy, Taiwan's weakest pointGas makes 48% of Taiwan's power and its LNG reserve lasts about 12 days of use [39].
    More

    The PLA practised strikes on simulated "key ports and energy facilities" in April 2025 [8]; Kaohsiung's Yong'an terminal is Taiwan's largest LNG import site [25]. Taiwan's LNG supply is already strained by the Gulf war and Qatar's force majeure [31].

  4. Shipping and insuranceThe Taiwan Strait carries about a fifth of the world's sea trade [1].
    More

    Ships routed east of Taiwan add up to 3 days [32]. An estimated 57% of Taiwan's sea trade entered through Kaohsiung in 2022 [25]. War-risk listing of the strait would raise premiums; the strait was not a listed area in Strature's last check, which rests on a source of August 2022, and no current listing circular was found [32].

  5. Growth and marketsBloomberg Economics' 2026 model (an outside estimate, not a Strature forecast) puts a blockade's first-year cost at 12.5% of Taiwan's GDP, 8.9% of China's and 5.3% of world GDP [28][30].
  6. AlliancesJapan's prime minister said on 7 Nov 2025 that an attack on Taiwan could be a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan; China answered with a travel warning on 14 Nov and other measures [27].
    More

    A quarantine would test the US, Japan and the Philippines without a shot fired: in a 2024 CSIS survey, only 13% of US experts were "completely confident" the US would intervene militarily against one [25].

Sectors 5

  • Technology
  • Autos
  • Ports and logistics
  • Banks and insurers
  • Energy and pipelines

Straits 3

Who is exposed

Countries
Taiwan, China, Japan, South Korea, United States, Philippines, Canada
Sectors
Technology, Autos, Ports and logistics, Banks and insurers, Airlines, Energy and pipelines
Goods
Semiconductors, LNG, Crude oil, Naphtha
Straits
Taiwan Strait, Bashi channel, Luzon strait
Companies
TSMC, CPC, Taipower

Three scenarios and their signposts

  1. S1

    Pressure below the line

    Daily naval and government-ship patrols continue, one named drill comes in the Nov-Dec season or after the local elections, and June-style radio checks repeat, but no Taiwan-bound ship is boarded.

  2. S2

    A partial quarantine

    As in a CSIS scenario centred on Kaohsiung, China declares customs or traffic-safety rules for ships calling at one port, and its coast guard stops and searches a few Taiwan-owned ships for one to two weeks.

  3. S3

    Truce holds, the squeeze eases

    A second year of Trump-Xi deals keeps drills short and political, and KMT gains on 28 Nov ease Beijing's pressure.

The signposts of each scenario
PathSignpost
S1An Eastern Theater Command exercise name
S1Coast guard 'law enforcement' notices around Taiwan
S1APEC Shenzhen 18-19 Nov passes without a Xi-Takaichi row
S2A Ministry of Transport or coast guard notice naming a Taiwan port
S2Boardings inside 24 nautical miles
S2Insurers list the Taiwan Strait
S2Truce lapses on 10 Jan 2027
S3No named drill by mid-2027
S3US arms notifications delayed
S3F-0199 resolves true on 30 Jun 2027. Strature forecast F-0199: 47% (2 Oct 2026)

No probability is given for the three paths.

Forecasts

Strature forecast linked to this risk

47%F-0199 · Taiwan and the Philippines: no named drill and no clash
Strature forecast F-0199: 47% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 30 Jun 2027
050100%

Where the card uses it F-0199 resolves true on 30 Jun 2027. Strature forecast F-0199: 47% (2 Oct 2026)

Other forecasts the card links Open one for what it forecasts and where the card uses it

  • F-020028%Forecasts: Taiwan and the Philippines: a named drill, no clash

    Strature forecast F-0200: 28% (2 Oct 2026);

    Strature forecast F-0200: 28% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 30 Jun 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-020112%Forecasts: Taiwan and the Philippines: a clash at sea

    Strature forecast F-0201: 12% (2 Oct 2026);

    Strature forecast F-0201: 12% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 30 Jun 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-02024%Forecasts: Taiwan and the Philippines: coercion short of war (a blockade or quarantine of a Taiwan port)

    Strature forecast F-0202: 4% (2 Oct 2026);

    Strature forecast F-0202: 4% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 30 Jun 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-02033%Forecasts: Taiwan and the Philippines: open conflict (an attack)

    Strature forecast F-0203: 3% (2 Oct 2026);

    Strature forecast F-0203: 3% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 30 Jun 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-02046%Forecasts: Taiwan and the Philippines: all other outcomes

    Strature F-0199 to F-0204 resolve (C-005 Taiwan question). Strature forecast F-0204: 6% (2 Oct 2026)

    Strature forecast F-0204: 6% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 30 Jun 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-007461%Forecasts: A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 (operative)

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0074: 61% (21 Aug 2026) · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · brief S-001

A forecast is a probability on a dated question. The Likelihood score above is a separate judgement and is never turned into a percentage.

The forecast register lists every forecast and how it is scored.

Dates to watch

Calendar

The dates to watch

A dot is a day, a bar a month or a year; a hollow mark is tentative. The line marks today.

  1. Nov 2026 PLA's usual Nov-Dec large-drill season watched by Taiwan's defence ministry [4] Tentative · Window
  2. 9 Nov 2026 BIS suspension of the US Affiliates Rule ends unless extended (no extension in the Federal Register on 25 Oct 2026, latest BIS document 14 Oct; a US official reportedly said 10 Jan 2027) [37] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  3. 10 Nov 2026 China's suspension of its Oct 2025 export controls ends (MOFCOM-GAC Announcement No. 70 of 2025; no extension listed on 25 Oct 2026) [44] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  4. 18 Nov 2026 APEC leaders' meeting in Shenzhen (18-19 Nov) [36] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  5. 28 Nov 2026 Taiwan's local elections [19] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  6. 25 Dec 2026 New local officials sworn in [20] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  7. 10 Jan 2027 US-China trade truce (the Kuala Lumpur joint arrangement, extended to this date per MOFCOM) ends unless extended again [45] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  8. 30 Jun 2027 Strature F-0199 to F-0204 resolve (C-005 Taiwan question). Strature forecast F-0199: 47% (2 Oct 2026); Strature forecast F-0200: 28% (2 Oct 2026); Strature forecast F-0201: 12% (2 Oct 2026); Strature forecast F-0202: 4% (2 Oct 2026); Strature forecast F-0203: 3% (2 Oct 2026); Strature forecast F-0204: 6% (2 Oct 2026) [1] Declared · Strature date

    Remind me

  9. Jul 2027 TSMC Arizona second fab (N3) targets volume production in H2 2027 (shown at its first month) [23] Tentative · Outside event

Sign in, with alerts on, for an email 7 days and 1 day before.

SourceStrature world-risk card; the dates cite the sources below.
Exhibit R-3 · WORLD · strature.net

The other side

Each drill pushes buyers to spread risk, and that spending lands outside the strait: TSMC's Arizona programme is US$265bn [23], and Japan, South Korea and the Philippines gain packaging and foundry work [30]. Taiwan showed in 2026 it can switch fuel suppliers fast (nearly 70% of crude from the Middle East in 2024, about 60% from the US by April 2026) [39]. Strature's view: a Taiwan and Japan seeking non-Gulf, non-strait LNG and crude is a market for Canada to watch.

Connected in Strature

Sources

42 sources, numbered as the text cites them

  1. Strature brief C-005 Taiwan question KQ-23, register F-0199 to F-0204. Strature · 2026-10 · Think tank · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  2. N-2026-0004 China holds live-fire drills off its coast; Taiwan watches for more. Strature · 16 Oct 2026 · Think tank · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  3. Taiwan watching for large-scale PLA drills as peak season nears. Focus Taiwan (CNA) · 15 Oct 2026 · News · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  4. PLA activity around Taiwan, 25 Oct 2026. Taiwan Ministry of National Defense · 25 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  5. PLA activity around Taiwan, 24 Oct 2026. Taiwan Ministry of National Defense · 24 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  6. PLA activities in the waters and airspace around Taiwan, Oct. 14 2026. Taiwan Ministry of National Defense · 14 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  7. Spokesperson: Chinese PLA concludes latest joint exercises (Xinhua). China Daily Hong Kong · 2 Apr 2025 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  8. China's Military Exercises Wind Down. TaiwanPlus · 31 Dec 2025 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  9. Spokesperson statement on China's military exercise around Taiwan. European External Action Service · 30 Dec 2025 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  10. China to stage drills around Taiwan in 'stern warning' to external forces. Al Jazeera · 29 Dec 2025 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  11. Quasi-Quarantine Operations Held East of Taiwan. Jamestown Foundation · 18 Jun 2026 · Think tank · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  12. Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. Wikipedia · 25 Oct 2026 · Commentary · confidence low · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  13. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's regular press conference, 14 May 2026. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC · 14 May 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  14. Xi, Cheng vow to bring people across Taiwan Strait 'closer'. Focus Taiwan (CNA) · 10 Apr 2026 · News · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  15. China and the United States Reach Eight Deliverables and Understandings. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC · 26 Sep 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  16. All 24 KMT lawmakers, Hsinchu mayor survive recall votes. Focus Taiwan (CNA) · 26 Jul 2025 · News · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  17. 2025 Taiwanese recall votes. Wikipedia · 25 Oct 2026 · Commentary · confidence low · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  18. Taiwan's 2026 local elections to be held on Nov. 28. Focus Taiwan (CNA) · 31 Oct 2025 · News · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  19. 2026 Taiwanese local elections. Wikipedia · 25 Oct 2026 · Commentary · confidence low · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  20. Taiwan passes U.S. arms bill with spending ceiling of US$24.8 billion (update). Focus Taiwan (CNA) · 8 May 2026 · News · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  21. TSMC Reports Third Quarter EPS of NT$29.43. TSMC · 15 Oct 2026 · Company · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  22. TSMC Arizona. TSMC · 25 Oct 2026 · Company · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  23. TSMC Fabs. TSMC · 25 Oct 2026 · Company · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  24. How China Could Quarantine Taiwan: Mapping Out Two Possible Scenarios. CSIS China Power Project · 5 Jun 2024 · Think tank · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  25. China military buildup leaves US 'increasingly vulnerable': Pentagon report. Breaking Defense · 24 Dec 2025 · News · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  26. 2025-2026 China-Japan diplomatic crisis. Wikipedia · 25 Oct 2026 · Commentary · confidence low · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  27. The $10 Trillion Fight: Modeling a US-China War Over Taiwan. Insurance Journal (Bloomberg News) · 12 Feb 2026 · News · confidence low · retrieved 6 Oct 2026
  28. Annual External Trade Report in 2025. Ministry of Finance (Taiwan) · 23 Feb 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 6 Oct 2026
  29. Library dossiers TWN, CHN, JPN, KOR, USA, PHL, CAN (semiconductors-taiwan). Strature · 23 Oct 2026 · Think tank · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  30. Dossier TWN, gulf-war-hormuz (Qatar force majeure; CPC and Taipower fuel costs). Strature · 23 Oct 2026 · Think tank · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  31. Straits hub taiwan-strait and scenario card taiwan-strait (SI-0101 of Aug 2022). Strature · 14 Oct 2026 · Think tank · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  32. Taiwan and US seal deal to lower tariffs, boost chip investment. Al Jazeera · 16 Jan 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 6 Oct 2026
  33. Impeachment vote targeting President Lai fails (update). Focus Taiwan (CNA) · 19 May 2026 · News · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  34. Trump warns Taiwan against declaring independence (BBC News; Fox News interview). The Star (Kenya) · 15 May 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  35. APEC home page: Economic Leaders' Meeting 18-19 Nov 2026, Shenzhen. APEC Secretariat · 25 Oct 2026 · International body · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  36. One Year Suspension of Expansion of End-User Controls for Affiliates of Certain Listed Entities (90 FR 50857). Bureau of Industry and Security, Federal Register · 12 Nov 2025 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  37. The Iran Conflict Illuminates Taiwan's Unique Energy Security Challenge. CSIS · 14 May 2026 · Think tank · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  38. Live-fire drills: China conducts second day of war games around Taiwan. Al Jazeera · 2 Apr 2025 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  39. PLA aircraft and ships around Taiwan, 2-3 Apr 2025 (MND figures). Central News Agency · 3 Apr 2025 · News · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  40. 8 Japan Coast Guard vessels shadowed by China near Penghu: Taiwan. Focus Taiwan (CNA) · 23 Oct 2026 · News · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  41. MOFCOM-GAC Announcement No. 70 of 2025 (suspension to 10 Nov 2026). Ministry of Commerce of the PRC · 7 Nov 2025 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  42. MOFCOM Department of American and Oceanian Affairs explains the outcome of the eighth round of China-US economic and trade consultations (the Kuala Lumpur joint arrangement extended to 10 Jan 2027). Ministry of Commerce of the PRC · 2026-09 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 27 Oct 2026

Reviewed 25 Oct 2026 · version 2 · last change: reviewed · All risks