Countries in this scenario
European Union (27): dependency profile · South Korea: dependency profile
Which straits carry each one’s supply, and how each scenario reaches it.
Scenario · Red Sea Not a forecast
Follow Bab el-Mandeb avoided by half of traffic for 90 daysAlerts when its risks move. Free.
Half of normal traffic avoids the southern Red Sea and goes round the Cape: nothing is lost on lanes with a cited Cape alternative; everything diverted arrives late.
In short Going round the Cape for 90 days loses nothing on lanes with a cited Cape route: 55 million barrels of the economies shown arrive late, most of it the EU's. Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice.
This page answers: What happens when ships avoid the Red Sea and go round the Cape?
Part of Bab el-Mandeb
Showing: half of traffic avoids Bab el-Mandeb for 90 days, then 30 days of normal traffic (window 120 days); Cape detour +16 days (EIA).
Basis: the six economies tracked on every scenario page, oil in million barrels (mb), totals for cargo due in the 120-day window, some landing after it; the day chart below shows single days. All buyers on file, Canada included: 58 mb diverted, 58 mb late (up to 23 days), 0 mb lost.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close. Figures as of 6 Oct 2026; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; region level only; not for navigation. Moving dots on desktop only.
How much oil arrives late for each length of avoidance, on one day scale?
When does the gap open, and when does the late cargo arrive?
Which economies wait, how much, and for how many extra days?
| Economy | Lost | Arrives late | Extra days | First cargo due late, day | Peak share late |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | – | – | – | – | – |
| South Korea crude | 0 | 4.5 | +16–23 | 21 | 1.8% |
First cargo due lateday 21Peak share late1.8% | |||||
| China | – | – | – | – | – |
| India | – | – | – | – | – |
| United States | – | – | – | – | – |
| European Union (27) crude | 0 | 51 | +16–23 | 8 | at least 3.4% |
First cargo due lateday 8Peak share lateat least 3.4% | |||||
| Six economies (the figures in the card) | 0 | 55 | |||
| Due after the period (departs inside it, would arrive after it; no country row) | 0 | 0 | never added to the rows | ||
| Other importers on file, not in the card's figures | |||||
| Canada | 0 | 2.6 | +16–23 | 8 | 5.6% |
First cargo due lateday 8Peak share late5.6% | |||||
| Germany EU member: inside the European Union (27) figure, never added to it | 0 | 3.3 | +16–23 | 8 | 3.1% |
First cargo due lateday 8Peak share late3.1% | |||||
| France EU member: inside the European Union (27) figure, never added to it | 0 | 4.3 | +16–23 | 8 | 5.1% |
First cargo due lateday 8Peak share late5.1% | |||||
When half of traffic avoids Bab el-Mandeb for 90 days and goes round the Cape, nothing is lost on lanes with a cited Cape route; the diverted cargo arrives late. Of the six economies shown, the EU and South Korea have oil volumes on this lane: 55 million barrels arrive late over 120 days, 51 million of them the EU's (58 million for all buyers on file), with the Cape adding about 16 days from the Gulf to northwest Europe. The Gulf's crude to Asia does not use Bab el-Mandeb as its main lane; Korea's volume here is crude from outside the Gulf. Illustrative arithmetic, not a forecast.
This reading describes the card's own case: half of traffic avoids the strait for 90 days, the EIA's +16 days via the Cape, a 120-day window. Other choices on this page change the figures, not the reading.
Which trade lanes use Bab el-Mandeb, and what goes round the Cape?
Which other goods wait, and for whom?
Each good is counted in its own unit and never added to another. Refined fuels are on file in tonnes; they are not converted to barrels, so they are not in the oil figures above.
Mt = million tonnes, kt = thousand tonnes, bcm = billion cubic metres.
How much longer is the voyage round Africa?
Which input changes the result most, at this length?
Each bar runs the same scenario with one input changed; the others stay at the card's setting. Illustrative arithmetic, not a forecast.
What did insurers charge when owners last avoided the strait?
What moves were observed in the comparable period, 2023 to 2024?
No forecast on this strait yet. The forecast register
Naming a bank, broker or firm whose study or figure is cited is not a view on it or its securities. Named parties and readers may send corrections to corrections@strature.net.
Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say "the Gulf" for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation. No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us.
The Gulf
East and South-east Asia
South Asia
Oceania
East Africa
Europe
Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa
The Caspian
North America
South America
Other exporters
Source
Title: {title}
Figure: {figUnit}
Period: {v} · confidence: {v2}
Open the source
Close
Source record not on this page.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close. Figures as of {as_of}; each figure shows its own period.
Terms
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules.
Half
(our case)
Most, 75%
(variant)
+16 days
EIA, used
+10 days
IMF, variant
half of traffic avoids
most traffic (75%) avoids
Red Sea · {share}, {d} days
+16 days (EIA)
+10 days (IMF)
Showing: {share} Bab el-Mandeb for {d} days, then 30 days of normal traffic (window {H} days); Cape detour {v}.
Diverted round the Cape
{st} mb
Avoidance days only: {la} mb
Arrives late
Illustrative arithmetic
illustrative
{la} mb
days
Avoidance days only: {la} mb
Lost
{lo} mb
Avoidance days only: {lo} mb · due after the period: {v} mb
Basis: the six economies tracked on every scenario page, oil in million barrels (mb), totals for cargo due in the {H}-day window, some landing after it; the day chart below shows single days. All buyers on file, Canada included: {st} mb diverted, {la} mb late (up to {v} days), {lo} mb lost.
the European Union
, crude from {map}, outside the Gulf
({sumRows} mb{v})
What happens to a cargo that avoids the strait?
; this view uses the IMF's 'at least 10 days'{sb}
only {parts} has
have
It goes round the Cape of Good Hope. From the Gulf to northwest Europe that adds about 16 days (EIA, 2024){sb}{v}, plus 0–7 days to re-plan (Strature assumption). Every lane on file has a route round the Cape, so nothing is lost: the cargo arrives late. The figures above add the six economies tracked on every scenario page (Japan, South Korea, China, India, the United States, the European Union). Of them, {v2} oil on this lane: all of it arrives late, nothing is lost. Late is never added to lost.
Bab el-Mandeb
half
avoid it
Suez
Cape of Good Hope
the Gulf
Red Sea
European Union
Japan
South Korea
East Asia
East Africa:
importers not on file
← to Canada
three quarters
The teal lanes are the usual routes through Bab el-Mandeb and Suez; their width is the share that still uses them. The dashed amber lane is the long way round the Cape, taken by {v} of traffic in this view. Shaded land marks the importers on file whose cargo arrives late: the European Union, Japan and South Korea (cargo from Europe, the Mediterranean and the Caspian) and Canada. The route model has no flows yet to East African importers.
75%
→ to Japan and South Korea
late · lost
day
· {lo} mb
Does a longer avoidance lose cargo?
mb at {d} days
No. At every length the six economies lose nothing; late oil grows with the days: {join}. Each late cargo arrives up to {v} days after it was due; in this view the first late cargo lands on day {firstArr}, and late cargo keeps landing for the same number of days after traffic returns.
No oil flow on file.
Day
, traffic avoids the strait
, traffic back to normal
(traffic avoids the strait until day {d})
(traffic is back to normal from day {d})
Day {day} of days 0–{last}{v}: usual volume {base} mb/d; due today but on the long way round {away}; late cargo arriving today {arr}; arriving in all {v2} mb/d. The dashed line is the high run (8 days at sea, 7 days to re-plan): late cargo arrives in a burst once ships leave. {replace}
Day {day} of days 0–{last}
at least {v}%{src}
First cargo due late
day {fl}
Peak share late
Economy
Extra days
First cargo due late, day
crude
Six economies
(the figures in the card)
Due after the period
(departs inside it, would arrive after it; no country row)
never added to the rows
Other importers on file, not in the card's figures
EU member: inside the European Union (27) figure, never added to it
–: no oil on this lane on file (Japan's goods on the lane are in tonnes, below). Million barrels of oil (crude only; refined fuels are in tonnes, below) over the {H}-day window, low and high runs. Extra days: the Cape detour plus 0–7 days to re-plan. First cargo due late: cargo already past the strait arrives as usual until then (8–16 days at sea, Strature assumption); the first late cargo lands that many extra days later. Peak share late: the largest share of the economy's oil supply on file that is late on one day. At least: a lower bound, as some of the economy's flows on this lane have no cited share of its imports; –: no share to show yet. Nothing is lost, so no stock draw is computed: the page shows delay, not a shortfall. Lost includes nothing held: no cargo waits in the Gulf in this scenario.
Lane
Flows
Oil late, mb
LNG late
from {join}; to {join2}
Goods: {join}
+ {oilMem} Germany, France (inside EU)
On file are {n} small flows from East Africa and the Indian Ocean ({join}) to Europe; all arrive late by the same extra days.
No East African importer (Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan) has a flow in the route model yet: they are on the next list of countries to source, so the page shows no volume for them, not zero. {v}
Good
Arrives late, by importer (own unit)
(inside EU)
EIA: Gulf to northwest Europe (2024)
IMF: Asia–Europe, average, at least (Jan–Feb 2024)
Lloyd's List: Asia–Europe container ships avoiding canal fees (Dec 2022)
This scenario: extra days on arrival (low–high runs)
or more
used
Which figure does the page use, and why?
The route model uses the EIA's +16 days for Gulf to northwest Europe{sb} on every lane on file (a Strature assumption: no cited figure per lane yet). The IMF's 'at least 10 days' is the variant{sb2}. The container figure of 9–14 days dates from 2022, when ships went round the Cape to save canal fees{sb3}. Distance: Shenzhen to Rotterdam is about 10,000 nautical miles via Suez and 13,000 via the Cape (UNCTAD){sb4}.
Traffic that avoids: half → 75%
late oil, mb
Cape detour: +16 (EIA) → +10 (IMF)
extra days
Days to re-plan: 0 → 7
Days to re-plan before the long route
0–7 days
In 2026 the first instruction to re-route oil after the Hormuz closure was reported 3–4 days after it began (as reported by Reuters).
Cargo already past the strait arrives as usual
8–16 days at sea
Days at sea after Bab el-Mandeb to buyers other than East Asia: no cited figure on file yet.
Red Sea to East Asia (cargo for Japan and South Korea from Europe, the Mediterranean and the Caspian)
21–24 days at sea
Cited distances: the Saudi Red Sea coast to China about 6,700 nautical miles (Clarksons), to South Korea 24 days direct (Poten). Days are Strature arithmetic.
One Cape detour for every lane
Cited for Gulf to northwest Europe only (EIA, high confidence); applied to Asia–Europe, Gulf–Canada and Europe–East Asia lanes as well. Variant: the IMF's +10 days.
Nothing is lost
every lane has a Cape route
Each lane on file through Bab el-Mandeb carries a modelled route round the Cape; ships and charter capacity are assumed to be available.
How many avoid the strait
half (card)
75% (variant)
A scenario choice, not an estimate. Observed by mid-2024: Gulf of Aden tonnage 76% below late 2023 (UNCTAD), closer to the 75% variant.
Window
days, then 30 days of normal traffic
Totals cover the whole window (avoidance plus 30 days); the avoidance days alone are shown beside them.
Stocks
not drawn in this scenario
Nothing is lost, so no stock draw is computed for any importer; late cargo is shown with its days, never as a shortfall.
Scenario choice
Strature assumption
confidence: {c}
Evidence: {ev}{v}
comparable period
last observed: {last_ins}
listed-area change
War-risk premium {v}% of hull value, {period}
War-risk premiums for a transit, in % of the ship's hull value, as reported (one mark per cited figure, never joined into a series; tap a mark for its source). Before 19 November 2023 quotes were below 0.1% (Singapore Ministry of Transport){sb}; {length} reported figures since, from 0.07% to 3% (the 3% is low confidence){sb2}. The shaded band is the observed period most like this scenario: from December 2023 to mid-2024 many owners avoided the strait. It is a past period, not a projection. The listed-area change of 18 Dec 2023, when the London insurance market's Joint War Committee widened its southern Red Sea listed area (as reported by Argus Media){sb3}, is a dated tick; the area is not drawn.
Gulf of Aden tonnage, mid-2024 against late 2023 (UNCTAD)
trade volume round the Cape, Jan–Feb 2024, year on year (IMF)
ship capacity arriving at the Cape, mid-2024 (UNCTAD)
Suez Canal transits a month, May 2023 and Jan 2024 (UNCTAD)
Brent crude, daily spot (EIA)
range over 15 Nov 2023 to 30 Apr 2024
Brent: Red Sea premium named by Rebecca Babin, CIBC Wealth Management (as reported by Business Insider)
early Feb 2024; single source
Gasoil futures, Europe (Oilprice.com, citing the Financial Times)
early Feb 2024; +15% from mid-Dec 2023
Observed move
Figure
Period
Confidence
Observed in the comparable period, each with its own date and source. No published study is matched to this scenario: published estimates are matched by the size of the supply gap, and here nothing is lost. Not a Strature price. Not a forecast.
Could the pipeline from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean carry the diverted oil?
It is not modelled here. Its design capacity is 117 million tonnes a year{sb}, about 2.24–2.35 mb/d depending on barrels per tonne (Strature arithmetic on the cited design). In April 2026 one Egyptian official put its maximum at 2.5 mb/d (single source, low confidence){sb2}. It starts on the Red Sea side of Suez, so cargo coming from the south reaches it only through Bab el-Mandeb (Strature assumption, route geography); in this scenario diverted cargo goes round the Cape instead.
This reading describes the card's own case: half of traffic avoids the strait for 90 days, the EIA's +16 days via the Cape, a 120-day window. Other choices on this page change the figures, not the reading.
Suez Canal transits each month, as published by the Suez Canal Authority.
EIA's reports on oil moving through the Red Sea and round the Cape.
UNCTAD's reports on traffic through the Gulf of Aden and the Cape of Good Hope.
Insurers' listed-area circulars for the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, with their dates.
Only flows on file with a 2025 volume (network bundle, round 3). Goods in tonnes or bcm are never converted or added to oil.
East African importers have no flows on file yet; the page shows no figure for them.
No stock draws are computed (nothing is lost), so no shortfall is shown: late cargo is shown with its days.
Ship and charter availability, port congestion, freight rates and bunker costs are not modelled.
The pipeline from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean is context only.
Strature computes no price and no premium; prices and premiums shown are observed, dated and sourced.
Every figure is precomputed and checked before the page is built; nothing is computed in your browser.
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European Union (27): dependency profile · South Korea: dependency profile
Which straits carry each one’s supply, and how each scenario reaches it.
Suppliers, straits and buyers on one map: who depends on which strait, good by good.
What can reach one company, where and when: four companies, read from public sources.
Which of your company’s places sit behind this strait? An exposure assessment of your own company, free.