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Australia

Australia's direct stake is urea: Hormuz producers supplied 59.8% of 2025 imports by value. Its fuel comes from Asian refineries that run largely on Gulf crude. Approved reading

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  • Region Asia-Pacific · Australia and the Pacific
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Your exposure

Australia in our readings

Australia is in 3 of our country readings; High in 2.

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High
  • Canada's capital projects High
  • US tariffs and Canada Medium

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Country card

Energy and value chains

EXHIBIT T-1 · AUSTRALIA
Australia produced more energy than it used in 2024.
Each figure in its own unit; each figure's year is shown.
Net import dependence, all energy
net exporter2024 · our calculation, EIA data
Largest energy source
Oil, 39.4%2024 · share of primary energy use · our calculation, EIA data
Electricity mix
Coal, 42.7%2025 · share of electricity generated · EmberRenewables 38.7% The latest year is partly estimated by Ember.
Coal supplier concentration (HHI, 0–1)
0.002024 · index 0–1, EC line 0.40 · our calculation, EIA dataEC band: diversified Built from partner data (mirror): suppliers that publish nothing are missing, so the index is a lower bound.

Where Australia sits in value chains

  • Lithium mining 31.7%USGS · 2025 est.
  • Manganese mining 8%USGS · 2025 est.
  • Cobalt mining 1.2%USGS · 2025 est.
  • Nickel mining 1.2%USGS · 2025 est.

Shares as published, each with its own measure and period; never added across stages.

All stages on the value-chains page

SourceUS Energy Information Administration, EIA International Energy Data, energy balance by fuel (bulk INTL), all countries (Public domain (US federal work); credit EIA); Ember, Electricity data (yearly and monthly) (All of Ember's electricity data is fully open, CC BY 4.0.); US Energy Information Administration, EIA US imports and exports by partner country, petroleum products, natural gas and coal (bulk PET, NG, COAL) (Public domain (US federal work); credit EIA). Value chains: USGS (Public domain (US federal work); credit the US agency named in the source). Shares and the index: our calculation from these figures.How to read this plateEach figure carries its own year and unit; they sit side by side and are never added into one score. Supplier concentration: 0 = many small suppliers, 1 = one supplier; the European Commission draws a line at 0.40.
Exhibit T-1 · Australia · strature.net

The supply balance, good by good, is under Goods and chokepoints.

Outlook to October 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Not yet set
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Not yet set
  • Supply chains and chokepoints High
  • Energy and resources Elevated
  • Technology and cyber Not yet set
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Not yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare Australia on the outlook map

Dates for Australia on the risk calendar

Key questions (4)
The other side: 10 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach Australia

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High

    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Strait of Hormuz

  • US tariffs and Canada Medium

    • F-0173 · A lasting break: the old lockstep does not return - US tariffs on Canadian goods above their 2024 level on 30 Sep 2027, re-scored after 20 Jan 2029 · 92%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 30 Sep 2027 · Open · brief C-006

    US tariffs and Canada

  • Canada's capital projects High

    • F-0151 · A build with a government term · 16%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 31 Oct 2027 · Open · brief Q-021

    • F-0152 · A build on private contracts only · 27%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 31 Oct 2027 · Open · brief Q-021

    • F-0155 · A standstill · 27%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 31 Oct 2027 · Open · brief Q-021

    Canada’s capital projects

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

Who runs short first is not shown for Australia: no Hormuz shipping volume (tonnes or barrels) for it is on file, and the scenario cases need one.

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much Australia makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • Monthly Australian Petroleum Statistics: days of cover for diesel, petrol and jet. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Monthly Urea imports by origin and the world urea price, against US$472 a tonne before the war (World Bank, Feb 2026). Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Quarterly Whether the excise cut is extended or reversed. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • 31 Oct 2027 F-0151, F-0152 and F-0155 resolve. Canada's capital projects
  • 31 Oct 2027 F-0151 and F-0152 resolve: a fund's build stake in Canada, with or without a government term. US tariffs and Canada
  • Monthly Canada's alumina imports and aluminium exports by destination. US tariffs and Canada

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of the risks above reach our own suppliers, customers or assets in Australia?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Australia, and which outcome would change them?
  • Which dated items under What to watch fall inside our next planning cycle?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Full analyst view

Open Australia on the map of brief questions

Dependency profile

Country card · Australia, importer through the straits

Chokepoints. The Energy and Value-chain strips appear here as each is approved for Australia.

Chokepoints

Urea and nitrogen fertilisers, import dependence
95%

More than half of its petrol imports come from Singapore, and about 95% of its urea is imported. 1

Modelled shares by strait (Strature route model)
  • Crude oil, 2025: Panama 21% · Cape 5.7% (the route model covers 90% of its named imports) modelled
  • LPG, 2025: Panama 93% (the route model covers 94% of its named imports) modelled

Not on file

  • A cited share of imports through Hormuz
  • Oil stocks in days

Dashed underline = low confidence.

importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›

Where Australia’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way

DirectionYear

Sources in this profile

Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Modelled shares come from Strature’s route model, not from a cited figure.

Show the list

    Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.

    No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.

    Country analysis

    Questions our briefs address

    The questions our published briefs address that touch Australia.

    Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Australia

    Australia's direct stake is urea: Hormuz producers supplied 59.8% of 2025 imports by value. Its fuel comes from Asian refineries that run largely on Gulf crude.

    Theme band High

    2.22

    urea from Hormuz producers (2025)

    US$29.7bn

    refined product import bill (2025)

    54.6%

    Gulf crude inside product imports (2025, our calculation)

    US$38.5bn

    LNG exports (2025)

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • Urea for planting: Hormuz producers supplied 59.8% of 2025 urea imports by value, and 2.22 Mt of the 3.68 Mt by weight.
    • Fuel stocks were reported at about 29-36 days of use during the 2026 crisis (an estimate; the source gives no date); the IEA's 90-day rule is counted differently, in days of net imports. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Singapore supplied 25.9% of Australia's refined product imports in 2025, the largest share, and drew 71.8% of its own crude imports from Hormuz producers.
    • The fuel excise was cut 50% in Mar 2026 (an estimate); a further cut would cost more revenue. Estimate from press or commentary

    Opportunities

    • LNG exports were US$38.45bn in 2025, and Australia was Singapore's second LNG supplier (35.1%) after Qatar (43.5%), so Asian buyers replacing Qatari LNG may turn to it.
    • Urea from outside the Gulf is close by: Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia supplied 0.39, 0.37 and 0.29 Mt in 2025.

    Uncertainties

    • Fuel stock days come from a Wikipedia summary, not the official petroleum statistics, which could not be reached. Estimate from press or commentary
    • The embedded Gulf crude share assumes suppliers' 2025 crude slates; several cut Gulf crude after the war began.
    • Farm exports to the Gulf may lose buyers: GCC states took 8.8% of barley exports and 69.2% of live sheep and goat exports in 2025, but the sheep trade is small (US$24.3m), and no trade figures since the war began were found.

    What to watch

    • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves; a renewed strike before the next autumn planting would test urea supply.
    • MonthlyAustralian Petroleum Statistics: days of cover for diesel, petrol and jet.
    • MonthlyUrea imports by origin and the world urea price, against US$472 a tonne before the war (World Bank, Feb 2026).
    • QuarterlyWhether the excise cut is extended or reversed.

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    Fertiliser (urea)Food and farming59.8% 2025Share of urea imports from Hormuz-dependent Gulf producers (excluding Oman)HighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Gulf share of 2025 imports, by input (%)
    Share of urea imports from Hormuz-dependent Gulf producers (excluding Oman): 59.8% (2025)Urea59.8Gulf crude embedded in refined product imports (import share x supplier's Gulf crude share): 54.6% of product imports (2025) (our calculation)Gulf crude embedded…*54.6Share of DAP imports (HS 310530) from Saudi Arabia (Ma'aden): 23.3% (2025)DAP23.3Share of refined product imports (HS 2710, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producers: 1.9% (2025)Refined product1.9Share of crude oil imports (HS 270900, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producers: 0.2% (2025)Crude oil0.2

    GulfElsewhere

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API): AUS imports, HS 310210 (urea) by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): AUS imports, HS 310530 (DAP) by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): AUS imports, HS 270900 (crude oil) by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): AUS imports, HS 2710 (petroleum oils other than crude (refined products)) by partner, 2025. * Our calculation from the cited figures.

    Briefs and questions

    Sources cited

    Estimates from press or commentary

    Our calculations

    • Urea imports from Hormuz Gulf producers, volume: 2.22 Mt (= 0.8626 + 0.5952 + 0.5317 + 0.2283 Mt (UN Comtrade 2025 partner rows) = 2.218)
    • Gulf crude embedded in refined product imports (import share x supplier's Gulf crude share): 54.6% of product imports (= sum over suppliers of (share of product imports by value, UN Comtrade HS 2710 2025 × supplier's Gulf share of crude imports): Korea 25.08% × 69.9%; Singapore 25.86% × 71.76%; Malaysia 13.35% × 53.63%; India 8.25% × 45%; Taiwan 8.25% × 61%; China 6.56% × 39.7% = 54.60)
    • Scenario: extra cost of replacing one quarter of Hormuz-Gulf urea at the April 2026 peak premium: US$0.21bn (= 2.22 Mt / 4 × (850 - 472) US$/t = 0.555 Mt × 378 = US$0.210bn)
    • Scenario: extra refined product import bill for one quarter if prices rise 15%: US$1.11bn per quarter (= 29.69 / 4 × 15% (10-20%) = 7.42 × 0.15 = 1.11 (0.74-1.48))
    • Scenario: one-quarter cost (fuel + urea) as % of GDP: 0.07% of GDP (= (1.11 + 0.21) / 1798.52 = 1.32 / 1798.52 = 0.073%)

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 25 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

    Canada's capital projects · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for Australia

    IFM, owned by Australian super funds, stated an intention to invest up to C$10bn in Canada over a decade: pledged, not placed. Q-021 found no new IFM acquisition in Canada to 27 Sep 2026.

    Theme band High

    C$10bn

    IFM pledge over the next decade, up to (C$bn; pledged, not placed)

    1

    Santos LNG heads of agreement with Ksi Lisims, 20 years (Mtpa; not binding, plant not yet decided)

    1.91%

    Share of inward FDI stock, ultimate investor (2025); 2.28% by immediate investor

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • IFM tied its intention to 'the right policy settings' (IFM, Mar 2026). Q-021 found no new Canadian acquisition by IFM between that statement and 27 Sep 2026.
    • IFM's up to C$10bn is 5.6% of the C$180bn of pledges Q-021 tracks; 1 of 7 pledges had a placement.
    • By one infrastructure manager's estimate (Igneo, low confidence), Australia was among the three most active infrastructure markets by deal value in 2021-2025, competing for the same money. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Santos's 1 Mtpa is a heads of agreement (Sep 2026), not a binding contract, and depends on Ksi Lisims reaching a final investment decision, which it has not taken.

    Opportunities

    • IFM funds already hold GCT Global Container Terminals, which handles about 70% of Port of Vancouver container volumes, and Enwave Energy.
    • IFM signed an MoU with Australian and Canadian pension funds; its target sectors are roads, ports, energy, water and data centres.
    • One qualifying build stake of C$1bn would be 10% of IFM's stated ceiling (Strature calculation).

    Uncertainties

    • The FDI band uses the ultimate investor: 1.91% of inward stock, below the line; by immediate investor it is 2.28% (2025).
    • The pledge names no asset and no schedule within the decade.

    What to watch

    • 31 Dec 2026Ksi Lisims final investment decision, which its backers have targeted for the end of 2026 (Q-021 signpost; the project page gives no date); Santos's heads of agreement covers 8.3% of the plant's planned capacity.
    • QuarterlyA first Canadian acquisition by IFM since its Mar 2026 statement; Q-021 found none to 27 Sep 2026.
    • 31 Oct 2027F-0151, F-0152 and F-0155 resolve.

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    Capital pledgedCapital and financeC$10bn (up to) 2026-03IFM Investors intention to invest in Canada over the next decadeHighHigh ≥C$10bn · Medium C$3–10bn · Low C$1–3bn
    OfftakeTrade1 Mtpa 2026-09Santos LNG Heads of Agreement with Ksi Lisims LNG (20 years, Free On Board)LowHigh ≥4 Mtpa, or ≥C$5bn, or ≥25% of records · Medium ≥2 Mtpa, or ≥C$2bn, or 10-25% of records · Low ≥1 Mtpa, or ≥C$1bn
    FDI stockCapital and finance1.91% 2025Australian direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (ultimate investor)Below lineHigh ≥10% · Medium 3–10% · Low 2–3%

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Australian direct investment stock in Canada, immediate investor (C$bn)
    Australian direct investment stock in Canada (immediate investor): C$36.4bn (2025)202536.4Australian direct investment stock in Canada (immediate investor): C$32.9bn (2024)202432.9Australian direct investment stock in Canada (immediate investor): C$26bn (2023)202326.0

    By immediate investor: the country where the investment is booked. The band uses the ultimate-investor basis, the country of the company that controls it.

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada, by country, annual (book value, C$ millions).

    Briefs and questions

    Sources cited

    Estimates from press or commentary

    Our calculations

    • Australian direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (ultimate investor): 1.91% (= 30,509 / 1,600,470 (C$ millions))
    • IFM's up-to pledge as a share of the C$180bn of pledges Q-021 tracks: 5.6% (= 10 / 180)
    • Santos's share of Ksi Lisims LNG capacity (heads of agreement): 8.3% (= 1 / 12)
    • A C$1bn qualifying build stake as a share of IFM's up-to C$10bn ceiling: 10% (= 1 / 10)
    • Australian direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (immediate investor): 2.28% (= 36,431 / 1,600,470 (C$ millions))

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 23 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Canada's capital projects →

    US tariffs and Canada · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for Australia

    Australia holds C$36.4bn of direct investment in Canada; IFM has stated a conditional intention to invest up to C$10bn more. Australia supplies 28.0% of Canada's alumina imports, feedstock for smelters whose metal faces US duties.

    Theme band Medium

    C$36.4bn

    Direct investment in Canada, immediate basis (2025)

    C$10bn

    IFM Investors' intention to invest in Canada, up to C$bn (Mar 2026)

    28%

    Australia's share of Canada's alumina imports (2025)

    0.42%

    Australia's share of Canada's goods exports, excluding gold (2025)

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • Australian alumina worth C$0.95bn a year feeds Canadian smelters; if US duties cut Canadian aluminium output, that demand falls.
    • IFM stated its intention of up to C$10bn over a decade 'with the right policy settings' (IFM, Mar 2026); Q-021 found no Canadian acquisition by IFM to 27 Sep 2026.
    • A Canadian recession (F-0174) would weigh on returns from C$36.4bn of Australian holdings.

    Opportunities

    • Australia joined Canada's Critical Minerals Production Alliance in Mar 2026.
    • Santos signed a heads of agreement, still subject to a sales contract, for 1 million tonnes a year over 20 years from Ksi Lisims LNG, a possible non-US outlet for Canadian gas; the plant has no final investment decision yet.
    • Canada's exports to Australia excluding gold rose 18.6% in 2025, to C$3.08bn.

    Uncertainties

    • Australia is one of the five CPTPP members Q-022 measures as redirect markets, but its share of Canada's exports, 0.42%, is still small.
    • How far Canadian smelter output would fall under a lasting break is not measured here.

    What to watch

    • 31 Oct 2027F-0151 and F-0152 resolve: a fund's build stake in Canada, with or without a government term.
    • MonthlyCanada's alumina imports and aluminium exports by destination.
    • Apr 2027Statistics Canada's next annual direct investment release, by immediate and ultimate investor.
    • 30 Sep 2027F-0173 resolves: US tariffs still above their 2024 level.

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    Capital in CanadaCapital and financeC$36.4bn 2025Direct investment position in Canada (book value, immediate investor country)MediumHigh ≥C$100bn · Medium ≥C$25bn and <C$100bn · Low ≥C$10bn and <C$25bn, or a pledge with nothing found placed
    Diversification marketTrade0.42% of Canada's goods exports 2025The country's share of Canada's goods exports excluding goldBelow lineHigh ≥3% · Medium 1–3% · Low 0.5–1% (growth or brief-named)

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Australia and Canada: direct investment positions, 2025 (C$bn)
    Canadian direct investment position in the country (book value): C$50.1bn (2025)Outward (Canada's)50.1Direct investment position in Canada (book value, immediate investor country): C$36.4bn (2025)Inward, immediate36.4Direct investment position in Canada, ultimate investor basis (book value): C$30.5bn (2025)Inward, ultimate30.5

    Immediate investor: the country where the investment is booked. Ultimate investor: the country of the company that controls it.

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada, by country, annual (book value); Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0433-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada by ultimate investor country, annual (book value).

    Briefs and questions

    • C-006 F-0173 A lasting break: US tariffs still above their 2024 level, 92%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.
    • Q-022 The 50% duty line by line; six redirect markets measured
    • Q-021 Pledged capital and placements in Canada
    • Q-021 F-0151, F-0152 A fund's C$1bn-plus build stake, 16% / 27%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.

    Sources cited

    Our calculations

    • Share of all foreign direct investment in Canada booked to the country (immediate basis): 2.3% of FDI in Canada (= immediate-investor position / all FDI in Canada × 100)

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 23 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: US tariffs and Canada →

    Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Australia: what passes the strait

    More than half of its petrol imports come from Singapore, and about 95% of its urea is imported.

    Route shares are modelled estimates; each figure carries its source. General research, not advice.

    Open on the Hormuz page The briefing

    ISO 3166-1 name: Australia (AUS). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

    Sources and licences

    No figure on this page yet.

    Cite this page Strature, “Australia”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/aus/, 31 Oct 2026.

    • We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
    • General research, not advice.
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