Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief
Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Indonesia
Indonesia's exposure runs through sulphur: Gulf producers supplied 74.7% of its 2025 sulphur imports by value (4.02 of 5.26 Mt by weight), an input for nickel processing and fertiliser.
4.02
sulphur from Gulf producers (2025)
31%
of propane imports from Gulf producers (2025)
US$22.5bn
fuel subsidy budget, 2026
23est.
of fuel reserves (Mar 2026, press estimate)
Read the full panel
Risks
- Sulphur from the Gulf is hard to replace quickly: 4.02 Mt of the 5.26 Mt imported in 2025.
- Fuel reserves were short, about 23 days in Mar 2026 (press estimate). Estimate from press or commentary
- Higher oil prices land on the budget: the 2026 fuel subsidy is US$22.5bn, and a widely used fuel was raised 32% in Jun 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
- Refined products: Gulf producers supplied 10.2% directly in 2025, and most of the rest came from Singapore, whose refineries lost Gulf crude; our calculation puts Gulf crude inside 62.1% of product imports.
Opportunities
- Indonesian urea can fill gaps left by Gulf urea: it supplied US$128.6m (0.29 Mt) of Australia's urea in 2025.
- Crude is diversified: Saudi Arabia, the only Gulf supplier, provided 17.7% of 2025 crude imports by value.
Uncertainties
- Sulphur imports rose from 3.62 Mt in 2024 to 5.26 Mt in 2025; how much more nickel leaching will need is not known.
- No Gulf share of Indonesia's remittances was found, so the labour lens is not banded.
- Butane imports were not checked; the LPG share covers propane only.
What to watch
- 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves; a renewed strike would cut Gulf sulphur and LPG together.
- MonthlyCustoms sulphur imports by origin, against 4.02 Mt from the Gulf in 2025.
- QuarterlyFuel subsidy spending against the US$22.5bn budget.
- MonthlyNickel processing output and any acid shortages reported by producers.
Exposure by channel
| Channel | Figure | Band | Published line |
|---|---|---|---|
| SulphurSupply chain | 74.7% 2025Share of sulphur imports (HS 2503, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producers (excluding Oman) | High | High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% |
| Crude oilDependence | 17.7% 2025Share of crude oil imports (HS 270900, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producers | Low | High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25% |
| Refined productsDependence | 10.2% 2025Share of refined product imports (HS 2710, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producers | Low | High ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20% |
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
GulfElsewhere
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API): IDN imports, HS 2503 (sulphur) by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): IDN imports, HS 271112 (propane) by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): IDN imports, HS 270900 (crude oil) by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): IDN imports, HS 2710 (petroleum oils other than crude (refined products)) by partner, 2025.
Briefs and questions
- T-003 · How much did each cargo through the Strait of Hormuz fall in 2026? Crude through the Strait fell to under a quarter of its late-2025 flow in Q2 2026.
- T-003 · Which economies are most exposed to the Gulf fertiliser shock? Gulf economies supply about a quarter of world nitrogen fertiliser exports.
- T-003 · Had Hormuz crude flows recovered by late September 2026? Refined products recovered least after the reopening.
- S-001 F-0074 Renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran by 20 Nov 2026, 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Sources cited
- UN Comtrade (public API): IDN imports, HS 271112 (propane) by partner, 2025 (2025; retrieved 19 Oct 2026)
- ORF: ASEAN's energy vulnerability and the impact of the Hormuz crisis (17 Jul 2026) (2026; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- UN Comtrade (public API): IDN imports, HS 2503 (sulphur) by partner, 2025 (2025; retrieved 19 Oct 2026)
- UN Comtrade (public API): IDN imports, HS 270900 (crude oil) by partner, 2025 (2025; retrieved 19 Oct 2026)
- UN Comtrade (public API): IDN imports, HS 2710 (petroleum oils other than crude (refined products)) by partner, 2025 (2025; retrieved 19 Oct 2026)
- UN Comtrade (public API): AUS imports, HS 310210 (urea) by partner, 2025 (2025; retrieved 19 Oct 2026)
Estimates from press or commentary
- VIR: ASEAN countries exposed by Middle East oil dependence (23 Mar 2026, Maybank Investment Bank data) (Mar 2026; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Reuters: Indonesia raises price of widely used fuel by 32% (10 Jun 2026), via Wikipedia, 2026 Iran war fuel crisis (10 Jun 2026; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
Our calculations
- Sulphur imports from Gulf producers, volume: 4.02 Mt (= 1.7569 + 0.9305 + 0.8941 + 0.3655 + 0.0704 + 0.0003 Mt (UN Comtrade 2025 partner rows) = 4.018)
- Gulf crude embedded in refined product imports (import share x supplier's Gulf crude share): 62.1% of product imports (= sum over suppliers of (share of product imports by value, UN Comtrade HS 2710 2025 × supplier's Gulf share of crude imports): Singapore 49.47% × 71.76%; Malaysia 26.52% × 53.63%; China 2.28% × 39.7%; Korea 1.47% × 69.9%; India 0.7% × 45%; Gulf direct excl. Oman 10.17% × 100% = 62.14)
- Scenario: Gulf sulphur to replace if Gulf loadings stop for a quarter: 1 Mt per quarter (= 4.018 Mt / 4 = 1.0045, stored as 1.00 Mt (input precision))
- Scenario: extra crude and product import bill for one quarter if prices rise 15%: US$1.07bn per quarter (= (9.31 + 19.19) / 4 × 15% = 7.13 × 0.15 = 1.07 (10-20%: 0.71-1.43); = 4.8% of the US$22.5bn subsidy budget)
- Scenario: Gulf propane to replace if Gulf loadings stop for a quarter: 0.27 Mt per quarter (= 1,083.2 kt / 4 = 0.271 Mt)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 25 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →