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Singapore

Singapore is the region's refinery and fuel store: Hormuz producers supplied 71.8% of its 2025 crude imports by value (52.3% in 2024), and Gulf LNG fuels a power system that runs 95% on gas. Approved reading

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Your exposure

Singapore in our readings

Singapore is in 4 of our country readings; High in 2.

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High
  • Chipmaking in Taiwan High
  • Canada's capital projects Medium
  • US tariffs and Canada Low

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Country card

Energy and value chains

EXHIBIT T-1 · SINGAPORE
Singapore imported 99.0% of the energy it used in 2024.
Each figure in its own unit; each figure's year is shown.
Net import dependence, all energy
99.0%2024 · share of the energy it used · our calculation, EIA data
Largest energy source
Oil, 85.4%2024 · share of primary energy use · our calculation, EIA data
Electricity mix
Gas, 91.1%2025 · share of electricity generated · EmberRenewables 5.5% The latest year is partly estimated by Ember.
LNG supplier concentration (HHI, 0–1)
0.012024 · index 0–1, EC line 0.40 · our calculation, EIA dataEC band: diversified Built from partner data (mirror): suppliers that publish nothing are missing, so the index is a lower bound.

Value-chain positions: not on file.

SourceUS Energy Information Administration, EIA International Energy Data, energy balance by fuel (bulk INTL), all countries (Public domain (US federal work); credit EIA); Ember, Electricity data (yearly and monthly) (All of Ember's electricity data is fully open, CC BY 4.0.); US Energy Information Administration, EIA International Energy Data (API v2, bulk) (Public domain (US federal work); credit EIA). Shares and the index: our calculation from these figures.How to read this plateEach figure carries its own year and unit; they sit side by side and are never added into one score. Supplier concentration: 0 = many small suppliers, 1 = one supplier; the European Commission draws a line at 0.40.
Exhibit T-1 · Singapore · strature.net

The supply balance, good by good, is under Goods and chokepoints.

Outlook to October 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Not yet set
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Not yet set
  • Supply chains and chokepoints Not yet set
  • Energy and resources Elevated
  • Technology and cyber Elevated
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Not yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare Singapore on the outlook map

Dates for Singapore on the risk calendar

Key questions (5)
The other side: 12 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach Singapore

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High

    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Strait of Hormuz

  • US tariffs and Canada Low

    • F-0173 · A lasting break: the old lockstep does not return - US tariffs on Canadian goods above their 2024 level on 30 Sep 2027, re-scored after 20 Jan 2029 · 92%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 30 Sep 2027 · Open · brief C-006

    US tariffs and Canada

  • Canada's capital projects Medium

    • F-0155 · A standstill · 27%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 31 Oct 2027 · Open · brief Q-021

    Canada’s capital projects

  • Chipmaking in Taiwan High

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

    Taiwan

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

Who runs short first is not shown for Singapore: no Hormuz shipping volume (tonnes or barrels) for it is on file, and the scenario cases need one.

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much Singapore makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • Quarterly SP Group tariffs, which reflect fuel costs. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Monthly MPA bunker sales, against 4.77 Mt in Aug 2026. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Daily Singapore gasoil and complex refining margins. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Nov 2026 Whether QatarEnergy extends force majeure on Asian term buyers. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Annual Trade data by partner: Taiwan's share of chip imports (47.8% in 2025). Chipmaking in Taiwan
  • 31 Oct 2027 F-0151 to F-0155 resolve; Woodfibre counts toward none of them. Canada's capital projects

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of the risks above reach our own suppliers, customers or assets in Singapore?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Singapore, and which outcome would change them?
  • Which dated items under What to watch fall inside our next planning cycle?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Full analyst view

Open Singapore on the map of brief questions

Dependency profile

Country card · Singapore, importer through the straits

Chokepoints. The Energy and Value-chain strips appear here as each is approved for Singapore.

Chokepoints

Not enough open data

More than half of the crude for its refineries comes from the Middle East, and it is the world's sixth-largest refinery export hub. 1

Not on file

  • A cited share of imports through Hormuz
  • Import dependence
  • Oil stocks in days
  • Modelled shares by strait

Dashed underline = low confidence.

importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›

Where Singapore’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way

DirectionYear

Sources in this profile

Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Modelled shares come from Strature’s route model, not from a cited figure.

Show the list

    Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.

    No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.

    Country analysis

    Questions our briefs address

    The questions our published briefs address that touch Singapore.

    Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Singapore

    Singapore is the region's refinery and fuel store: Hormuz producers supplied 71.8% of its 2025 crude imports by value (52.3% in 2024), and Gulf LNG fuels a power system that runs 95% on gas.

    Theme band High

    33.8

    crude from Hormuz producers (2025)

    1.5est.

    refining capacity

    95%

    of electricity from natural gas

    56.77est.

    bunker fuel sold in 2025, a record

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • Refinery runs fell when Gulf crude stopped: ExxonMobil cut its 592 kb/d Jurong site to about 50% in Mar 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Gas sets the power price: gas makes 95% of electricity, and the tariff rose 2.1% in Q2 2026.
    • Asian LNG spot doubled to US$22/MMBtu at the peak, so any Qatari cargo replaced on the spot market costs more.
    • Bunker sales slipped: 4.77 Mt in Aug 2026, down 4% on a year earlier. Estimate from press or commentary

    Opportunities

    • Fuel margins were high: the Singapore gasoil margin hit a record US$85.63 a barrel on 30 Mar 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Singapore supplies the region's fuel: US$7.68bn of products went to Australia in 2025, its largest supplier.
    • The growth outlook rose: MTI raised its 2026 forecast to 4.5-5.5% in August. Estimate from press or commentary

    Uncertainties

    • Sources now sit closer on Qatar's LNG share: 43.5% by value in 2025 trade data and about 45% in 2025 press reports. The IEA puts Qatar and the UAE together at over half. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Refinery run cuts come from a news factbox, not company figures. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Singapore discloses its oil stocks only as 'months', so no days-of-cover figure is used here.

    What to watch

    • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves; a renewed strike would cut Gulf crude to the refineries again.
    • QuarterlySP Group tariffs, which reflect fuel costs.
    • MonthlyMPA bunker sales, against 4.77 Mt in Aug 2026.
    • DailySingapore gasoil and complex refining margins.
    • Nov 2026Whether QatarEnergy extends force majeure on Asian term buyers.

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    Crude oilDependence71.8% 2025Share of crude oil imports (HS 270900, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producersHighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
    LNGEnergy50% 2025Share of LNG imports from Qatar and UAE (over half)HighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
    Refined productsDependence18.2% 2025Share of refined product imports (HS 2710, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producersLowHigh ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20%

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Hormuz Gulf share of 2025 imports (%)
    Share of crude oil imports (HS 270900, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producers: 71.8% (2025)Crude oil71.8Share of LNG imports (HS 271111, by value) from Qatar: 43.5% (2025)LNG43.5Share of refined product imports (HS 2710, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producers: 18.2% (2025)Refined product18.2

    GulfElsewhere

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API): SGP imports, HS 270900 (crude oil) by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): SGP imports, HS 2710 (petroleum oils other than crude (refined products)) by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): SGP imports, HS 271111 (LNG) by partner, 2025.

    Briefs and questions

    Sources cited

    Estimates from press or commentary

    Our calculations

    • Crude imports from Hormuz Gulf producers, volume: 33.8 Mt (= 19.943 + 6.449 + 3.941 + 3.246 + 0.239 Mt (UN Comtrade 2025 partner rows))
    • Scenario: Gulf crude to replace per quarter if Gulf loadings fall back to the 2Q 2026 level: 6.48 Mt per quarter (= 33.8 Mt / 4 × (1 - 3.7 / 15.9) = 8.45 × 0.767 = 6.48 Mt (about 47.5m bbl at 7.33 bbl/t))
    • Scenario: extra cost of replacing Qatari LNG for one quarter: US$0.1bn (= 3 cargoes × 3.076m MMBtu × US$11 premium = US$0.10bn)

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 25 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

    Chipmaking in Taiwan · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for Singapore

    Singapore took 47.8% of its US$113.57bn chip imports from Taiwan in 2025. Much is re-exported: hub shares measure trade exposure, not final demand. Two Taiwanese-led fabs are being built or ramped there.

    Theme band High

    47.8%

    of chip imports from Taiwan, 2025 (hub figure)

    US$54.3bn

    chip imports from Taiwan, 2025 (US$ bn)

    43.2%

    electrical and electronic goods, share of goods exports, 2025

    US$12.8bn

    Taiwanese-led fab investment in Singapore (US$ bn, Strature calculation)

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • Taiwan supplied 47.8% of chip imports in 2025 and 43.2% of processor imports. South Korea was the next source, at 17.7% and 23.3%.
    • Electrical and electronic goods were 43.2% of goods exports in 2025; integrated circuits alone were 23.9%. Both figures include re-exports.
    • Chip exports were US$135.51bn in 2025, including re-exports: 30.4% went to Hong Kong and 13.8% to China. An interruption of chip supply from Taiwan would reach this trade as well as local production.
    • Outside estimate, not a Strature forecast: Bloomberg Economics' model, in a 2026 update as reported in the press, puts a blockade of Taiwan at -5.3% of world GDP in its first year and a war at -9.6%. No figure for Singapore was found. Estimate from press or commentary

    Opportunities

    • VSMC, Vanguard's venture with NXP, plans US$7.8bn for its first build-out, for about 44,000 wafers a month at full capacity by 2029 (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
    • UMC opened its Fab12i P3 on 1 Apr 2025: a US$5bn first phase on 22nm and 28nm, with volume production from 2026 (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
    • Together the two fabs add US$12.8bn of investment in mature-node capacity: a second source for specialty chips, not for the leading edge (Strature calculation).

    Uncertainties

    • Trade statistics record the shipping origin: chips made in Taiwan but packaged elsewhere arrive under another origin, so the Taiwan share can understate the link.
    • Semiconductors are put at 44% of manufacturing output in one secondary source; others say over 20% (low confidence). Estimate from press or commentary
    • Equipment sales to Taiwan rest on one year: 23.3% of chip-equipment exports in 2025, against 13.9% in 2024; 38.4% went to China in 2025.

    What to watch

    • 2026Volume production at UMC's Fab12i P3 (press report).
    • AnnualTrade data by partner: Taiwan's share of chip imports (47.8% in 2025).
    • 2029VSMC at full capacity, as planned (press report).

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    Chip importsDependence47.8% 2025Share of electronic integrated circuits (HS 8542) imports from TaiwanHighHigh ≥40% · Medium 25–40% · Low 15–25%
    Advanced logicDependence43.2% 2025Share of processors and controllers (HS 854231, the advanced-logic proxy) imports from TaiwanMediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
    Chip-using industryTrade43.2% of goods exports 2025Electrical and electronic goods (HS 85 plus computers HS 8471) as share of goods exportsHighHigh ≥40% · Medium 20–40%
    Host fabsProcurementUS$7.8bnest. 2026VSMC fab (Vanguard of Taiwan with NXP, TSMC-licensed processes), initial build-out costMediumHigh ≥US$20bn · Medium US$5–20bn · Low US$1–5bn, or an operating fab without a disclosed figure
    Equipment and materialsTrade23.3% 2025Share of machines for making semiconductors and wafers (HS 8486) exports going to TaiwanMediumHigh ≥25% · Medium 15–25%

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Taiwan's share of Singapore's chip (HS 8542) and processor (HS 854231) imports, 2024 and 2025 (%)
    Share of electronic integrated circuits (HS 8542) imports from Taiwan: 48.3% (2024)2024, electronic integr…48.3Share of electronic integrated circuits (HS 8542) imports from Taiwan: 47.8% (2025)2025, electronic integr…47.8Share of processors and controllers (HS 854231, the advanced-logic proxy) imports from Taiwan: 45.1% (2024)2024, processors and co…45.1Share of processors and controllers (HS 854231, the advanced-logic proxy) imports from Taiwan: 43.2% (2025)2025, processors and co…43.2

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API): SGP imports of electronic integrated circuits (HS 8542) by partner, 2024; UN Comtrade (public API): SGP imports of electronic integrated circuits (HS 8542) by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): SGP imports of processors and controllers (HS 854231, the advanced-logic proxy) by partner, 2024; UN Comtrade (public API): SGP imports of processors and controllers (HS 854231) by partner, 2025.

    Briefs and questions

    Sources cited

    Estimates from press or commentary

    Our calculations

    • Investment by Taiwanese foundries and their partners in Singapore fabs (VSMC initial build-out plus UMC Fab12i P3 first phase): US$12.8bn (= VSMC initial build-out (US$7.8bn) + UMC Fab12i P3 first phase (US$5bn))

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 23 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Chipmaking in Taiwan →

    Canada's capital projects · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for Singapore

    Pacific Energy, owned by Singapore's RGE, holds 70% of Woodfibre LNG; its share of the capital cost is up to about C$9.5bn, an upper bound, not equity (Strature calculation). Enbridge expects service in 2027.

    Theme band Medium

    C$9.46bn

    Pacific Energy's 70% share of Woodfibre capital cost: an upper bound, not equity (C$bn, Strature calculation)

    8.8est.

    Woodfibre cost estimate, up from 5.1bn (press; currency not stated)

    0.65%

    Share of inward FDI stock, ultimate investor (2025); 0.64% by immediate investor

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • Woodfibre LNG was reported in Sep 2025 to have raised its cost estimate to 8.8bn from 5.1bn (currency not stated), up 73%, citing permit delays, building code changes and site conditions (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
    • BP takes 100% of the capacity for 15 years (Enbridge). The terms that allocate cost changes are not public.
    • The figure is capital cost, not equity: part may be debt-financed, and no equity split was found.

    Opportunities

    • Woodfibre, 2.1 Mtpa near Squamish, is expected in service in 2027.
    • Singapore's direct investment stock in Canada rose to C$10.3bn in 2025 from C$8.6bn in 2023 (immediate investor).

    Uncertainties

    • Enbridge's 30% share is US$2.9bn; the press puts the total at 8.8bn without a currency, so the two do not tie. Estimate from press or commentary
    • Our search in Oct 2026 found no Canadian figure for GIC or Temasek.

    What to watch

    • 2027Woodfibre in service, Enbridge's expected date.
    • 31 Oct 2027F-0151 to F-0155 resolve; Woodfibre counts toward none of them.
    • Annual (spring)Statistics Canada FDI by country; Singapore held 0.65% of the stock by ultimate investor in 2025.

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    Project equityCapital and financeC$9.46bn (capital-cost share, upper bound) 2026Pacific Energy (RGE) attributable share of Woodfibre LNG capital cost, in C$MediumHigh ≥C$5bn · Medium C$2–5bn · Low C$1–2bn

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Singaporean direct investment stock in Canada, immediate investor (C$bn)
    Singaporean direct investment stock in Canada (immediate investor): C$10.3bn (2025)202510.3Singaporean direct investment stock in Canada (immediate investor): C$8.91bn (2024)20248.9Singaporean direct investment stock in Canada (immediate investor): C$8.55bn (2023)20238.6

    By immediate investor: the country where the investment is booked. The band uses the ultimate-investor basis, the country of the company that controls it.

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada, by country, annual (book value, C$ millions).

    Briefs and questions

    Sources cited

    Estimates from press or commentary

    Our calculations

    • Pacific Energy (RGE) attributable share of Woodfibre LNG capital cost, in C$: C$9.46bn (capital-cost share, upper bound) (= US$6.77bn × 1.3978)
    • Singaporean direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (ultimate investor): 0.65% (= 10,440 / 1,600,470 (C$ millions))
    • Pacific Energy (RGE) attributable share of Woodfibre LNG capital cost: US$6.77bn (= 2.9 / 0.30 × 0.70)

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 6 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Canada's capital projects →

    US tariffs and Canada · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for Singapore

    Singapore holds C$10.3bn of direct investment in Canada; Pacific Energy, a Singapore-based group, was reported to hold 70% of Woodfibre LNG. Canada's exports there rose 41.7% in 2025; crude nearly doubled, to C$1.14bn.

    Theme band Low

    C$10.3bn

    Direct investment in Canada, immediate basis (2025)

    C$1.14bn

    Canada's crude oil exports to Singapore (2025)

    0.44%

    Singapore's share of Canada's goods exports, excluding gold (2025)

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • Woodfibre LNG was reported nearly 60% built in Mar 2026, with start-up expected in 2027 (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
    • If Trans Mountain fills and apportions spot nominations (F-0168), spot crude cargoes from the West Coast, including those to Singapore, could be cut back.
    • A Fortress North America alignment (F-0176) would tie Canada's outside tariffs to US policy and could slow an agreement with ASEAN.

    Opportunities

    • Canada's crude exports to Singapore rose from C$0.58bn in 2024 to C$1.14bn in 2025, 7.6% of Canada's non-US crude exports.
    • ASEAN and Canadian trade ministers aimed in Sep 2026 to finalise a free trade agreement by the ASEAN Summit in November, with signing planned in 2027.
    • Singapore is one of the five CPTPP members Q-022 measures as redirect markets; Canada's exports there rose 41.7% in 2025, to C$3.19bn.

    Uncertainties

    • Whether the 2025 crude rise lasts once Trans Mountain capacity is fully used is open.
    • Singapore-controlled investment, C$10.4bn, is slightly above the booked figure; part arrives through other countries.

    What to watch

    • Nov 2026ASEAN Summit: whether the Canada-ASEAN free trade agreement talks are finalised, the ministers' target.
    • 2027Woodfibre LNG start-up.
    • MonthlyCanada's crude exports by destination, including Trans Mountain cargoes to Asia.
    • 30 Sep 2027F-0173 resolves: US tariffs still above their 2024 level.

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    Capital in CanadaCapital and financeC$10.3bn 2025Direct investment position in Canada (book value, immediate investor country)LowHigh ≥C$100bn · Medium ≥C$25bn and <C$100bn · Low ≥C$10bn and <C$25bn, or a pledge with nothing found placed
    Diversification marketTrade0.44% of Canada's goods exports 2025The country's share of Canada's goods exports excluding goldBelow lineHigh ≥3% · Medium 1–3% · Low 0.5–1% (growth or brief-named)

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Singapore and Canada: direct investment positions, 2025 (C$bn)
    Canadian direct investment position in the country (book value): C$34.7bn (2025)Outward (Canada's)34.7Direct investment position in Canada (book value, immediate investor country): C$10.3bn (2025)Inward, immediate10.3Direct investment position in Canada, ultimate investor basis (book value): C$10.4bn (2025)Inward, ultimate10.4

    Immediate investor: the country where the investment is booked. Ultimate investor: the country of the company that controls it.

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada, by country, annual (book value); Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0433-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada by ultimate investor country, annual (book value).

    Briefs and questions

    • C-006 F-0173 A lasting break: US tariffs still above their 2024 level, 92%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.
    • Q-022 The 50% duty line by line; six redirect markets measured
    • C-006 F-0168 Trans Mountain apportions spot nominations, 20%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.

    Sources cited

    Estimates from press or commentary

    Our calculations

    • Share of all foreign direct investment in Canada booked to the country (immediate basis): 0.64% of FDI in Canada (= immediate-investor position / all FDI in Canada × 100)

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 23 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: US tariffs and Canada →

    Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Singapore: what passes the strait

    More than half of the crude for its refineries comes from the Middle East, and it is the world's sixth-largest refinery export hub.

    Its rank among the world's refinery export hubs (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026): 6th

    Route shares are modelled estimates; each figure carries its source. General research, not advice.

    Open on the Hormuz page The briefing

    ISO 3166-1 name: Singapore (SGP). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

    Sources and licences

    No figure on this page yet.

    Cite this page Strature, “Singapore”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/sgp/, 31 Oct 2026.

    • We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
    • General research, not advice.
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