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Netherlands

The Netherlands holds C$182.9bn of direct investment in Canada, much of it for investors elsewhere. Canadian aluminium turned to it in 2025: 31.0% of Dutch imports, from 12.3%. Approved reading

This page answers: Which questions do our briefs address about the Netherlands?

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  • Region Europe · Western Europe
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Your exposure

The Netherlands in our readings

The Netherlands is in 3 of our country readings; High in 1.

  • US tariffs and Canada High
  • Chipmaking in Taiwan Medium
  • Gulf war / Hormuz Low

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Country card

Energy and value chains

EXHIBIT T-1 · NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands imported 77.2% of the energy it used in 2024.
Each figure in its own unit; each figure's year is shown.
Net import dependence, all energy
77.2%2024 · share of the energy it used · our calculation, EIA data
Largest energy source
Oil, 52.3%2024 · share of primary energy use · our calculation, EIA data
Electricity mix
Gas, 34.9%2025 · share of electricity generated · EmberRenewables 51.2% The latest year is partly estimated by Ember.
Crude oil supplier concentration (HHI, 0–1)
0.132024 · index 0–1, EC line 0.40 · our calculation, Eurostat dataEC band: diversified Named suppliers cover 93% of imports.

The EU's position in value chains (the Netherlands is a member)

No value-chain share for the Netherlands alone is on file; these are the EU's, which include it.

  • Design software and IP as part of the EU 25%BCG and SIA · 2022
  • Chipmaking equipment as part of the EU 18%BCG and SIA · 2022
  • Analog and other design as part of the EU 17%BCG and SIA · 2022

Shares as published, each with its own measure and period; never added across stages.

All stages on the value-chains page

SourceUS Energy Information Administration, EIA International Energy Data, energy balance by fuel (bulk INTL), all countries (Public domain (US federal work); credit EIA); Ember, Electricity data (yearly and monthly) (All of Ember's electricity data is fully open, CC BY 4.0.); Eurostat, Energy imports and exports by partner country (nrg_ti_* and nrg_te_*), all Eurostat energy reporters (CC BY 4.0; commercial reuse allowed with source credit.). Value chains: BCG and SIA (facts-only: Copyright BCG and SIA; single facts cited with attribution (read via reproduction by a government office)). Shares and the index: our calculation from these figures.How to read this plateEach figure carries its own year and unit; they sit side by side and are never added into one score. Supplier concentration: 0 = many small suppliers, 1 = one supplier; the European Commission draws a line at 0.40.
Exhibit T-1 · Netherlands · strature.net

The supply balance, good by good, is under Goods and chokepoints.

Outlook to October 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Not yet set
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Elevated
  • Supply chains and chokepoints Low
  • Energy and resources Elevated
  • Technology and cyber Elevated
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Not yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare the Netherlands on the outlook map

Dates for Netherlands on the risk calendar

Key questions (2)
The other side: 7 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach the Netherlands

  • Gulf war / Hormuz Low

    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Strait of Hormuz

  • US tariffs and Canada High

    • F-0163 · Escalation short of withdrawal - tit-for-tat, more bans, 50% auto tariffs from January, and a progressive shrinking of tariff-free trade · 51%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 30 Sep 2027 · Open · brief C-006

    US tariffs and Canada

  • Chipmaking in Taiwan Medium

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

    Taiwan

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

Who runs short first is not shown for Netherlands: its Hormuz volumes on file stop at 2024, and the scenario cases run on one year, 2025.

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much the Netherlands makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

What to watch

  • Monthly Canada's aluminium exports by destination (Statistics Canada). US tariffs and Canada
  • 31 Dec 2026 The Q-027 forecasts on the EU share of Canada's exports resolve. US tariffs and Canada
  • 30 Sep 2027 Our forecast on escalation short of withdrawal (F-0163) resolves. US tariffs and Canada
  • Monthly Taiwan's imports of chip-making equipment by origin (Ministry of Finance trade statistics). Chipmaking in Taiwan
  • Ongoing Dutch and US export-control rules for lithography tools. Chipmaking in Taiwan
  • Weekly ARA product stocks (Insights Global) and diesel cracks. Gulf war / Hormuz

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of the risks above reach our own suppliers, customers or assets in the Netherlands?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in the Netherlands, and which outcome would change them?
  • Which dated items under What to watch fall inside our next planning cycle?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Full analyst view

Open the Netherlands on the map of brief questions

Dependency profile

Country card · Netherlands, importer through the straits

Chokepoints. The Energy and Value-chain strips appear here as each is approved for Netherlands.

Chokepoints

Crude oil, import dependence
100%
Modelled shares by strait (Strature route model)
  • Crude oil, 2024: Suez 14% · Bab el-Mandeb 13% · Hormuz 13% · Turkish Straits 9.7% · Panama 0.1% (the route model covers 93% of its named imports) modelled
  • Refined fuels, 2024: Suez 62% · Bab el-Mandeb 60% · Hormuz 30% · Malacca 5.7% · Panama 0.4% · Turkish Straits 0.3% (the route model covers 100% of its named imports) modelled
  • LPG, 2025: Panama 1.3% (the route model covers 65% of its named imports) modelled
  • LNG, 2024: Panama 5.6% · Bab el-Mandeb 2.8% · Suez 2.8% · Malacca 2.8% (the route model covers 100% of its named imports) modelled
  • Helium, 2025: Bab el-Mandeb 73% · Suez 73% · Malacca 73% (the route model covers 73% of its named imports) modelled

Not on file

  • A cited share of imports through Hormuz
  • Oil stocks in days
  • A headline line

Dashed underline = low confidence.

importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›

Where Netherlands’ supply comes from, and the straits on the way

DirectionYear

Sources in this profile

Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Modelled shares come from Strature’s route model, not from a cited figure.

Show the list

    Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.

    No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.

    Country analysis

    Questions our briefs address

    The questions our published briefs address that touch the Netherlands.

    US tariffs and Canada · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for Netherlands

    The Netherlands holds C$182.9bn of direct investment in Canada, much of it for investors elsewhere. Canadian aluminium turned to it in 2025: 31.0% of Dutch imports, from 12.3%.

    Theme band High

    C$182.9bn

    Direct investment in Canada, 2025

    31%

    Canada's share of Dutch aluminium imports, 2025

    49.6%

    Canada's share of Dutch uranium imports, 2025

    1.33%

    Share of Canada's exports excl. gold, 2025

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • Stellantis, a carmaker incorporated in the Netherlands, moved planned Jeep Compass output from Brampton, Ontario, to Illinois in Oct 2025 (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
    • Escalation (F-0163) bears on Dutch-registered holdings in Canada: C$182.9bn, 11.4% of all direct investment in Canada.
    • Aluminium shipped to Europe faces the EU carbon border charge (C-006).

    Opportunities

    • Canada sent C$1.34bn of unwrought aluminium to the Netherlands in 2025, from C$0.21bn; the US share of that trade fell from 94.1% to 80.6%.
    • Canadian crude for the Netherlands nearly doubled, to C$1.99bn in 2025.
    • Canada's exports to the Netherlands rose 35.9% in 2025, to C$9.66bn.

    Uncertainties

    • Direct investment is counted by immediate investor; the Netherlands is a conduit, so the owners behind the C$182.9bn are partly elsewhere.
    • Whether the aluminium shift lasts or was a one-year response to US duties.
    • Canada's share of Dutch uranium imports fell to 49.6% in 2025 from 59.4% in 2024.

    What to watch

    • MonthlyCanada's aluminium exports by destination (Statistics Canada).
    • 31 Dec 2026The Q-027 forecasts on the EU share of Canada's exports resolve.
    • 30 Sep 2027Our forecast on escalation short of withdrawal (F-0163) resolves.

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    Capital in CanadaCapital and financeC$182.9bn 2025Direct investment position in Canada (book value, immediate investor country)HighHigh ≥C$100bn · Medium ≥C$25bn and <C$100bn · Low ≥C$10bn and <C$25bn, or a pledge with nothing found placed
    Supply from Canada (aluminium)Dependence31% of the country's imports of the good 2025Canada's share of the country's imports of unwrought aluminium (HS 7601)MediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
    Supply from Canada (uranium)Dependence49.6% of the country's imports of the good 2025Canada's share of the country's imports of uranium and radioactive elements (HS 2844)MediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
    Diversification marketTrade1.33% of Canada's exports excl. gold 2025Share of Canada's goods exports going to the country, excluding goldMediumHigh ≥3% · Medium 1–3% · Low 0.5–1% (growth or brief-named)

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Canada's share of Dutch imports (%): uranium 2024 and 2025, aluminium 2025
    Canada's share of the country's imports of uranium and radioactive elements (HS 2844): 59.4% of imports of the good (2024)202459.4Canada's share of the country's imports of uranium and radioactive elements (HS 2844): 49.6% of the country's imports of the good (2025)202549.6Canada's share of the country's imports of unwrought aluminium (HS 7601): 31% of the country's imports of the good (2025)Unwrought aluminium31.0

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API), imports by reporter from Canada and from the world; UN Comtrade (public API), imports by partner, as reported by the importing country.

    Briefs and questions

    Sources cited

    Estimates from press or commentary

    Our calculations

    • Netherlands share of foreign direct investment in Canada: 11.4% of FDI in Canada (= Netherlands position / all-country position (book value, immediate investor))

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 6 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: US tariffs and Canada →

    Chipmaking in Taiwan · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for Netherlands

    The Netherlands' stake is as a supplier: Taiwan took 24.6% of Dutch chip-equipment exports in 2025, US$7.19bn, and about 22% of ASML's 2025 system sales (press summary of company results).est.

    Theme band Medium

    22%est.

    of ASML system sales went to Taiwan (2025)

    24.6%

    of chip-equipment exports went to Taiwan (2025)

    EUR32.7bn

    ASML total net sales (2025)

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • Taiwan was the second-largest destination of Dutch chip-equipment exports in 2025: US$7.19bn of US$29.28bn. An interruption at Taiwan's fabs would reduce tool sales and service there; X-001 treats a quarantine or blockade of Taiwan as a separate tail and does not size it.
    • China was ASML's largest market in 2025, at 33% of sales; ASML was reported to expect about 20% in 2026 (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
    • Outside estimate, not a Strature forecast: Bloomberg Economics' 2026 model puts the EU's first-year loss in a war over Taiwan at 10.9% of GDP, as reported in the press; no Dutch figure is published. Estimate from press or commentary

    Opportunities

    • Fabs built outside Taiwan need the same tools: South Korea took 24.1% and the US 14.3% of Dutch chip-equipment exports in 2025.
    • ASML's sales grew to EUR 32.7bn in 2025, up on 2024.

    Uncertainties

    • The 22% Taiwan share of ASML system sales comes from a press summary of company results, not the annual report. Estimate from press or commentary
    • In the trade data, Taiwan's share rose from 14.5% in 2024 to 24.6% in 2025; tool shipments are lumpy.
    • Only 3.7% of Dutch chip imports come from Taiwan, so the stake is on the supply side alone.

    What to watch

    • Jan 2027ASML full-year results and sales by region.
    • MonthlyTaiwan's imports of chip-making equipment by origin (Ministry of Finance trade statistics).
    • OngoingDutch and US export-control rules for lithography tools.

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    Equipment and materialsTrade22% of system salesest. 2025ASML system sales to customers in TaiwanMediumHigh ≥25% · Medium 15–25%

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Share of Dutch chip-equipment exports going to Taiwan (%)
    Share of machines for making semiconductors and wafers (HS 8486) exports going to Taiwan: 24.6% (2025)202524.6Share of machines for making semiconductors and wafers (HS 8486) exports going to Taiwan: 14.5% (2024)202414.5

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API): NLD exports of machines for making semiconductors and wafers (HS 8486) by partner, 2024; UN Comtrade (public API): NLD exports of machines for semiconductors (HS 8486), by partner, 2025.

    Briefs and questions

    Sources cited

    Estimates from press or commentary

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 23 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Chipmaking in Taiwan →

    Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Netherlands

    The Netherlands took 12.9% of its refined product imports from the Gulf in 2025, much of it re-exported through Rotterdam, and 9.4% of its crude, below the crude line. Low band, on products.

    Theme band Low

    12.9%

    Gulf share of refined product imports, 2025 (value; 13.1% by weight)

    9.4%

    Gulf share of crude imports, 2025 (value; below the 10% line by weight too)

    US$18.9bn

    Crude sent on to Belgium, US$ bn, 2025

    Read the full panel

    Risks

    • Gulf refiners supplied US$3.51bn of Dutch refined product imports in 2025, mostly from Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. Product flows through the Strait recovered least after it reopened (T-003).
    • Iraqi crude (6.17 Mt in 2025) is the largest Gulf stream into Rotterdam refineries.
    • Brent averaged US$114 in Sep 2026; refinery feedstock costs rise for all crude grades.
    • Loss of Gulf crude would pass through to Belgium, which draws crude from Rotterdam.

    Opportunities

    • Rotterdam is a hub: US$18.85bn of crude went on to Belgium in 2025, and re-routed Atlantic barrels pass through it.
    • LNG imports rose 28% in 2025 to 16.9 Mt, about three quarters (12.8 Mt) from the US, and the Netherlands takes 74.0% of Iceland's aluminium exports, a non-Gulf metal source.

    Uncertainties

    • How much of the Gulf crude and products is used in the Netherlands and how much is re-exported; the Rotterdam hub blurs the national share, so the 12.9% products share overstates Dutch use.
    • Sources differ on the products share: 12.9% in partner trade data and 11.9% in Eurostat's origin data for 2025 (13.4% in 2024); both sit in the Low band.
    • The Gulf crude share fell from 13.7% in 2024 to 9.4% in 2025, just below the 10% line, as Saudi crude fell to US$483.1m; Eurostat puts it lower, at 7.5%.

    What to watch

    • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves. A renewed strike could cut Basra loadings.
    • WeeklyARA product stocks (Insights Global) and diesel cracks.
    • MonthlyDutch crude and refined product imports by origin (CBS).

    Exposure by channel

    Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
    ChannelFigureBandPublished line
    Refined productsEnergy12.9% 2025Share of refined product imports (HS 2710) from Hormuz Gulf producers (value)LowHigh ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20%
    Crude oilEnergy9.4% 2025Share of crude imports from Hormuz Gulf producers (value)Below lineHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
    LNGEnergy16.9 Mt 2025LNG imports, totalBelow lineHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%

    Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

    Gulf share of Dutch imports, 2025: refined products and crude (value share %)
    Share of refined product imports (HS 2710) from Hormuz Gulf producers (value): 12.9% (2025)Refined product12.9Share of crude imports from Hormuz Gulf producers (value): 9.4% (2025) (our calculation)Crude*9.4

    GulfElsewhere

    Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API): Netherlands imports, refined petroleum products (HS 2710) by partner, 2025. * Our calculation from the cited figures.

    Briefs and questions

    Sources cited

    Our calculations

    • Share of crude imports from Hormuz Gulf producers (value): 9.4% (= (3109.4 + 483.1 + 19.1 + 0.02) / 38351.6)
    • Gulf crude to replace if Gulf supply stops for 3 months: 1.76 Mt (= (6.17 + 0.85) × 3 / 12 = 1.755)

    Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 19 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

    Strature analysis, not from the brief

    Netherlands: what passes the strait

    A European oil hub: Gulf suppliers gave 8% of its crude, 12% of its refined fuels and a fifth of its imports of rare gases such as helium in 2025.

    Netherlands is also counted in the European Union (as a bloc): its card on the Hormuz page.

    Route shares are modelled estimates; each figure carries its source. General research, not advice.

    Open on the Hormuz page The briefing

    ISO 3166-1 name: Netherlands (NLD). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

    Sources and licences

    No figure on this page yet.

    Cite this page Strature, “Netherlands”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/nld/, 31 Oct 2026.

    • We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
    • General research, not advice.
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