Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.
Outlook to October 2027
Geopolitics and conflictNot yet set
Trade, tariffs and sanctionsElevated
Supply chains and chokepointsLow
Energy and resourcesElevated
Technology and cyberElevated
Regulation and complianceNot yet set
Finance and marketsNot yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index
Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set
Geopolitics and conflict
Outlook
Not yet set
Index
2.3 /10range 1.1–3.6partial
First published October 2026: no earlier range to compare, so no arrow.
Data: European Commission Joint Research Centre (INFORM), INFORM Risk; Natural Earth; Strature, forecast register; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP battle deaths; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP event data; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators
Resolves if: By 31 Dec 2026 no association track has opened, between one and five of the six drafted summit deliverables are delivered by their tests, and the August-October 2026 EU share of Canadian goods exports is above 5.519%. our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0213 (Q-027)
Resolves if: By 31 Dec 2026 no association track has opened, all six drafted summit deliverables are delivered by their tests, and the August-October 2026 EU share of Canadian goods exports is above 5.519%. our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0212 (Q-027)
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced with a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0151 (Q-021)
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced, and no qualifying commitment carries a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0152 (Q-021)
General information, not advice.
Risks that reach France
Gulf war / HormuzMedium
F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001
Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.
F-0212 · The full package, and the EU share holds above 2025 · 8%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 31 Dec 2026 · Open · brief Q-027
F-0213 · A partial package, and the EU share holds above 2025 · 47%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 31 Dec 2026 · Open · brief Q-027
Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.
If the Strait of Hormuz closes
Who runs short first
Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.
France
supply shortfall begins:day 19
first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Inside the EU (27) figure: shown, never added to it or to a total
EU (27)
supply shortfall begins:day 19
first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Good by good (8)
Aluminiumsupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Heliumsupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Methanolsupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Polyethylene and polypropylenesupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Refined fuelssupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Sulphursupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Urea and nitrogen fertiliserssupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Wheatsupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Each good keeps its own day; days and quantities are never added across goods.
First to run short in this case: India, day 4.
Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.2, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; it does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
How much France makes, buys and sells, good by good
Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).Reading the supply balance
Supply balance first, suppliers second.
One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.
Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.
Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).
What to watch
Monthly Canada's exports to France and the EU-27 (Statistics Canada). US tariffs and Canada
31 Dec 2026 The Q-027 forecasts on the EU share of Canada's exports resolve. US tariffs and Canada
Feb 2027 Importers start buying EU carbon border (CBAM) certificates for 2026 imports, including Canadian steel and aluminium; the charge has applied since 1 Jan 2026 (C-006). US tariffs and Canada
Monthly Brent and the EIA outlook. Gulf war / Hormuz
Monthly French refined product and crude imports by origin. Gulf war / Hormuz
31 Oct 2027 F-0151 and F-0152 resolve. Canada's capital projects
Questions firms in this position often review
Which of our supplies, or our suppliers' inputs, reach France through the Strait of Hormuz, and how much of each could come another way?
How many days of stock do we hold in France against the day a supply shortfall begins there in the case shown?
Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in France, and which outcome would change them?
importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›
Where France’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way
DirectionYear
In scenarios: France
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Scenario
Questions about France
Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.
How much of France’s supply crosses Hormuz?
On file, 7–10% of its crude oil imports; 54–60% of its refined fuels imports; 1.7% of its LNG imports cross the strait.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
Who supplies France’s crude oil?
Kazakhstan 15% (2025), Nigeria 12% (2025), Norway 9.6% (2025) of its crude imports, with 1 more on the map. Each share is its own figure; they are not added.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of France’s energy is imported?
France imported 49% of the energy it used in 2024, and 93% of its oil.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How many days of oil stocks does France hold?
France held 97 days (Jul 2026), counted as emergency stocks, days equivalent (Eurostat).
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
What this means
No approved block reading for France yet; this section shows approved readings only.
Questions our briefs address
Questions our briefs address
The questions our published briefs address that touch France.
HighUS tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for FranceUS tariffsUS tariffs and Canada
Strature analysis, not from the brief
US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for France
Canada supplies 51.4% of France's iron-ore imports, a High stake on one channel. France holds C$30.4bn of direct investment in Canada, and its Senate voted against CETA's trade part in Mar 2024 (press report).
Theme band High
51.4%
Canada's share of French iron-ore imports, 2025
C$30.4bn
Direct investment in Canada, 2025
0.69%
Share of Canada's exports excl. gold, 2025
C$1.08bn
Beverages Canada bought from France, 2025
Read the full panel
Risks
France has not ratified CETA: its Senate voted 211 to 44 against the trade part in Mar 2024 (press report). It is one of 9 member states yet to ratify. Estimate from press or commentary
Q-027 records that the US has cited Canada's EU trade terms in setting duties on Canada, so closer EU-Canada trade may draw further US measures.
A Canadian recession (F-0174) would cut Canada's C$10.22bn of imports from France.
US duties on steel stay at 50% for EU goods (press summary), a cost for the steel that Canadian ore feeds. Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
Canada bought C$1.08bn of French beverages in 2025, up from C$0.98bn, while its US beverage imports fell to C$3.93bn.
Canadian canola seed for France rose to C$0.407bn in 2025 from C$0.115bn.
Uncertainties
Iron-ore values move with steel output and prices: US$0.503bn came from Canada in 2025.
Direct investment is counted by immediate investor, so French groups investing through other countries are missing from the C$30.4bn.
Whether CETA's trade part returns to a vote in France. Estimate from press or commentary
Canada supplied 14.0% of France's aircraft imports in 2025, down from 21.6% in 2024; a supply link, not a gain for France.
What to watch
MonthlyCanada's exports to France and the EU-27 (Statistics Canada).
31 Dec 2026The Q-027 forecasts on the EU share of Canada's exports resolve.
Feb 2027Importers start buying EU carbon border (CBAM) certificates for 2026 imports, including Canadian steel and aluminium; the charge has applied since 1 Jan 2026 (C-006).
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Supply from Canada (iron ore)Dependence
51.4% of the country's imports of the good2025Canada's share of the country's imports of iron ore (HS 2601)
High
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Capital in CanadaCapital and finance
C$30.4bn2025Direct investment position in Canada (book value, immediate investor country)
Medium
High ≥C$100bn · Medium ≥C$25bn and <C$100bn · Low ≥C$10bn and <C$25bn, or a pledge with nothing found placed
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Canada's share of French imports, 2025 (%)
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API), imports by partner, as reported by the importing country.
Country's share of Canada's goods exports to the EU-27: 11.7% of Canada's exports to the EU-27 (= Canada's 2025 exports to the country / Canada's 2025 exports to the EU-27)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 23 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: US tariffs and Canada →
MediumChipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for FranceChipsChipmaking in Taiwan
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for France
France took 30.4% of its chip imports from Taiwan in 2025, its largest single source, though at US$1.07bn the bill is small.
Theme band Medium
30.4%
of chip imports from Taiwan (2025)
31%
of chip imports from Taiwan (2024)
US$1.16bn
chip imports from Taiwan (2024)
Read the full panel
Risks
Taiwan was the largest source in both years: 31.0% of US$3.75bn of chip imports in 2024 and 30.4% of US$3.52bn in 2025.
The exposure sits in chip types other than processors: only 11.7% of processor imports came from Taiwan in 2024.
Outside estimate, not a Strature forecast: Bloomberg Economics' 2026 model puts the EU's first-year loss in a war over Taiwan at 10.9% of GDP, as reported in the press; no French figure is published. Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
Germany supplied 11.1% of chip imports in 2025, a nearby second source.
Electrical and electronic goods are 7.7% of goods exports (2024), so a chip stop touches users more than the export base.
Uncertainties
Trade data follow each reporter's own country-of-origin rules; where a reporter credits the packaging country, Taiwan-made dies packaged in Malaysia, the Philippines or Vietnam count as from those hubs, and Taiwan's role may be understated.
The import bill is small (US$3.75bn in 2024), so the share can swing with a few large orders.
What to watch
AnnualReporter trade data for the latest year of chip imports by origin.
MonthlyTaiwan's export statistics (Ministry of Finance): chip exports by destination.
OngoingReports of leading-edge volume production outside Taiwan, the main X-001 signpost.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Chip importsDependence
30.4%2025Share of electronic integrated circuits (HS 8542) imports from Taiwan
Medium
High ≥40% · Medium 25–40% · Low 15–25%
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Share of chip and processor imports from Taiwan (%)
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API): FRA imports of electronic integrated circuits (HS 8542) by partner, 2024; UN Comtrade (public API): FRA imports of electronic integrated circuits, by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): FRA imports of processors and controllers, by partner, 2024.
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 23 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Chipmaking in Taiwan →
MediumGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for FranceGulfGulf war / Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for France
France took 31.9% of its refined product imports from the Gulf in 2025, mostly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, but only 8.7% of its crude (4.70 Mt). Medium band, on refined products.
Theme band Medium
31.9%
Gulf share of refined product imports, 2025 (value; 34.0% by weight)
8.7%
Gulf share of crude imports, 2025 (value; below the 10% line)
4.7
Gulf crude, Mt, 2025
22.8
LNG imports, Mt, 2025 (0.6 from the Middle East)
Read the full panel
Risks
Gulf refiners supplied US$9.43bn of France's US$29.58bn of refined product imports in 2025, led by Kuwait (US$4.58bn), then Saudi Arabia. Product flows through the Strait recovered least after it reopened (T-003).
Iraqi crude, 3.51 of the 4.70 Mt France took from the Gulf in 2025, loads mostly at Basra, inside the Strait.
Brent averaged US$114 in Sep 2026; the EIA expects 105 in Q4 2026, which sets French fuel costs whatever the origin.
French ships are in the line of fire: a French shipping company reported a ship targeted on 19 Apr 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
Crude supply is broad: the US 25.1%, Kazakhstan 14.8%, Nigeria 13.5% and Algeria 9.1% in 2025, all outside the Gulf.
France is the EU's largest LNG importer, 22.8 Mt in 2025 with only 0.6 Mt from the Middle East, so its terminals can take re-routed Atlantic cargoes.
Uncertainties
Sources differ on the products share: 31.9% in partner trade data (by value, 2025) and 29.4% in Eurostat's origin data (26.2% in 2024); both sit in the Medium band.
How much Iraqi crude loads at Ceyhan rather than Basra.
The cost of France's naval role in a Hormuz coalition is not published. Estimate from press or commentary
What to watch
20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves. A renewed strike could cut Basra loadings and raise Brent.
MonthlyBrent and the EIA outlook.
MonthlyFrench refined product and crude imports by origin.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Refined productsEnergy
31.9%2025Share of refined product imports (HS 2710) from Hormuz Gulf producers (value)
Medium
High ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20%
Crude oilEnergy
8.7%2025Share of crude imports from Hormuz Gulf producers (value)
Below line
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Gulf share of French imports, 2025: refined products and crude (value share %)
GulfElsewhere
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API): France imports, refined petroleum products (HS 2710) by partner, 2025; UN Comtrade (public API): France imports, crude oil (HS 2709) by partner, 2025.
Gulf crude to replace if Gulf supply stops for 3 months: 1.18 Mt (= 4.70 × 3 / 12 = 1.175)
Gulf refined products to replace if Gulf supply stops for 3 months: 3.24 Mt (= 12.97 × 3 / 12 = 3.2425)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 19 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →
MediumCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for FranceCapitalCanada's capital projects
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for France
TotalEnergies signed a 20-year supply deal for 2 Mtpa from Ksi Lisims LNG (May 2025; plant undecided); a 5% stake is reported (Global Energy Monitor estimate). French-controlled firms hold 2.62% of Canada's inward FDI.
Theme band Medium
2
TotalEnergies LNG supply deal with Ksi Lisims, 20 years (Mtpa; company release, plant not yet decided)
16.7%
TotalEnergies' share of Ksi Lisims capacity (Strature calculation)
C$0.7bn
TotalEnergies' reported 5% of estimated cost, pre-decision: an upper bound, not equity (C$bn, Strature calculation)
2.62%
Share of inward FDI stock, ultimate investor (2025)
Read the full panel
Risks
Ksi Lisims had not reached a final investment decision at 1 Oct 2026; one was expected in 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
Cost estimates differ: US$10bn in one source; another gives C$10bn for the plant and C$12bn for the pipeline. Estimate from press or commentary
TotalEnergies' reported 5% stake would be about C$0.7bn of the estimated cost, below the C$1bn line, and is not project equity until a final investment decision.
Opportunities
If TotalEnergies took up its option to rise to 10% at a final investment decision, its share of the estimated cost would be about C$1.4bn (Strature calculation, not equity).
French direct investment stock in Canada rose to C$30.4bn in 2025 from C$27.0bn in 2023 (immediate investor).
Uncertainties
The FDI share depends on the basis: 2.62% by ultimate investor, 1.9% by immediate investor (2025).
Whether TotalEnergies takes up its reported option to 10% is not known. Estimate from press or commentary
What to watch
End-2026Ksi Lisims final investment decision, expected in 2026.
31 Oct 2027F-0151 and F-0152 resolve.
Annual (spring)Statistics Canada FDI by country; France held 2.62% by ultimate investor in 2025.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
High ≥4 Mtpa, or ≥C$5bn, or ≥25% of records · Medium ≥2 Mtpa, or ≥C$2bn, or 10-25% of records · Low ≥1 Mtpa, or ≥C$1bn
FDI stockCapital and finance
2.62%2025French direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (ultimate investor)
Low
High ≥10% · Medium 3–10% · Low 2–3%
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
French direct investment stock in Canada, immediate investor (C$bn)
By immediate investor: the country where the investment is booked. The band uses the ultimate-investor basis, the country of the company that controls it.
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada, by country, annual (book value, C$ millions).
TotalEnergies' attributable share of Ksi Lisims cost, in C$: C$0.7bn (= 0.05 × US$10bn × 1.3978)
French direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (ultimate investor): 2.62% (= 41,869 / 1,600,470 (C$ millions))
TotalEnergies' share of Ksi Lisims estimated cost at its 10% option, in C$: C$1.4bn (= 0.10 × US$10bn × 1.3978)
French direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (immediate investor): 1.9% (= 30,362 / 1,600,470 (C$ millions))
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 6 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Canada's capital projects →
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for FranceHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
France: what passes the strait
Jet fuel is the main Gulf exposure: Kuwait alone is its largest jet supplier, and Saudi Arabia leads its diesel imports.
Decision Brief · Q-027 · 1 questionBeyond CETA: what the EU relationship adds, and when exporters should commit
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
How many member states still have not ratified CETA, nine years on?
“France and Italy are among 10 member states that have not ratified CETA, 9 years after it began to apply. For exporters, today's terms keep running, but any access beyond them waits on those votes.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Canada Affected Belgium +8
Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.
Regions in these questions Europe · North America
ISO 3166-1 name: France (FRA). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.
Published briefs
Briefs with France as their subject.
No published brief has France as its subject yet; the questions above name it in another role.
Forecast register
Forecasts on the register attached to the questions above.
Each is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Published briefs only; the full register lists every one.
A registered question, separate from the scenario results on this page: no probability is carried into the scenarios.
No registered forecast is attached to these questions yet.
Registered forecasts attached to questions touching France: identifier, forecast, our estimate, issued, resolves by, status
The summary sheet and the executive read are free.
The full brief is supplied to organisations through the request form on the brief’s page: they accept its terms and confirm a work email, and it is free during the introductory period.
For organisations. About two minutes to request; the download link comes by email.
General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Sources in this profile
Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.
Show the list
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.
Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 30 Oct 2026.
Sources and licences
[1] Crude oil: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Eurostat, 2025
[2] LNG: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Eurostat, 2024
Cite this page Strature, “France”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/fra/, 31 Oct 2026.
Notes and limits
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; it does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us.
General research, not advice.
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